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I. INTRODUCTION
The vicious and brutal rape and murder of Megan Kanka drew
national attention to child sexual abuse and concerns on how to
1
prevent such tragedies from happening in the future. Soon after,
national attention focused on this case, as well as the term “sexual
predator,” and various pieces of legislation were considered to pre2
vent further similar occurrences. More specifically, issues of sexual
predator registration, community notification and sexual predator
civil commitment laws came to be topics of discussion.
Statutes in some states describe a “violent sexual predator” as
someone who is eligible for civil commitment. The definition applies to a person who has committed a crime of sexual violence,
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, and who is a stranger to the victim or cultivated the relation3
ship for the primary purpose of victimization. A violent sexual
1. G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues
of Punishment, Privacy and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1633-34 (1995). The author discusses community notification of sex offenders regarding registration and
community notification. It is possible to distinguish community notification from
similar sanctions, such as sex offender registration and certain probation conditions that have typically not been classified as punishment. When viewed as a penal sanction, community notification must comply with the same constitutional
requirements as other forms of punishment.
2. Id. at 1634.
3. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43,
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predator is an individual with such a high risk for future sexual violence that he or she needs to be committed to a facility for treatment until professionals consider him rehabilitated and less of a
risk to sexually re-offend. After being conditionally released from a
civil commitment institution for sex offenders, the individual would
be required to register with the community as a sexually violent
predator for community notification purposes. In a state with a
civil commitment sex offender law, only a fraction of sex offenders—the high-risk offenders, often called the “worst of the worst”—
would qualify for commitment.
The term “sexual predator” may have different meanings
based on different statutes, but most definitions require a sexually
dangerous individual who the court deems is likely to be a risk for
sexual re-offending in the future. The term, usually applied to offenders who offend against strangers, have multiple victims, have
prior sexual offenses, are sexually deviant and suffer from
paraphilias such as pedophila, commit violent offenses, and may
have exhibited other antisocial and criminal behaviors. Offenders
whose only victims are their own children, stepchildren, or intimate
partners are usually not labeled sexual predators, even if the crimes
are violent.
Individuals who are sexually deviant pose a higher risk. Contrary to public belief, not all sex offenders qualify for sexually deviant psychiatric disorders. If one is labeled a sexual predator, he or
she would be a high risk for sexual recidivism and as a result, would
be mandated to be registered in the community as a sexual predator for community notification and safety purposes. Factors indicating a high risk of sexual offending are stranger victims, male victims, multiple victims, young victims, multiple sex offense
convictions, prior sex offender treatment failure, psychopathy and
antisocial personality disorder, prior violent offenses, single marital
status, diverse sexual crimes, and sexual deviancy such as pedophilia.
In Megan’s case, her alleged killer had been convicted twice of
4
sex offenses against young children. Although he had a significant
sex offending background, once paroled, he lived with two other

43-44 (1998). The authors discuss the label “sexual predator” as being applied to
offenders who target strangers, have multiple victims, or commit especially violent
offenses.
4. Rafshoon, supra note 1, at 1633.
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sex offenders across the street from Megan and her family.
Megan’s rape and murder outraged the community and politicians,
6
causing a public outcry. Within three months of the murder, both
houses in the New Jersey legislature passed legislation and the
State’s Republican governor signed ten bills aimed at sex offend7
ers.
While community notification and the registration of sex offenders are two significant pieces of sex offender legislation, this
note will focus on the legislation regarding civil commitment of violent sexual predators. This author will argue that states should
have the autonomy to initiate legislation requiring civil commitment of violent sexual predators. The states should also focus on
the following: 1) imposing harsher sentencing guidelines; 2) substituting consecutive criminal sentencing guidelines rather than concurrent sentencing guidelines; and 3) developing comprehensive
8
sex offender treatment programs.
States should be granted the authority to enact civil commitment statutes to control violent sexual predators. This authority
should be a state right and should be excluded from the federal
domain. However, the states should consider initiating sex offender treatment while the defendant is in prison as part of his attempted rehabilitation. Furthermore, the states should impose
harsher sentences and consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences in some situations for serious sex offenders who have committed sexually violent acts. These steps may eliminate the need
for the civil commitment of sex offenders and conserve state resources. Finally, when assessing violent sex offenders for civil
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The author indicates that community notification laws do more than
make information on convicted sex offenders available to the public. They give
police a “green light” to publicize information about where the offender lives in
the community and information about his criminal history. Community notification laws actively disseminate the information. For example, certain states, like
Louisiana, require registration at the time of parole. The State requires offenders
convicted of sex offenses against victims under age eighteen to send personal information including their name, addresses, and crime(s) committed to the local
school superintendent and to individuals who live within a one-mile radius in a
rural area and a three square-block radius in a suburban or urban area. Convicted
offenders must also publish a notice in the local newspaper. Courts are permitted
to order sex offenders to provide neighbors with notice through various forms including signs, hand bills, bumper stickers, or the wearing of descriptive clothing.
Id at 1642.
8. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/2

4

Fabian: Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: "Mental Abnormality"? and
FABIAN_F ORMATTED .DOC

2003]

4/7/2003 11:07 AM

KANSAS V. HENDRICKS, CRANE AND BEYOND

1371

commitment purposes, there should be no significant distinguishing between volitionally impaired and emotional or personality impaired offenders if they both pose a high risk for future sex offend9
ing.
First, this paper will discuss the history of civil commitment
laws of violent sexual predators and how they have been and are
implemented. Emphasis will be placed on specific state laws and
their rationale. Definitions of mental illness pertaining to these
laws will be discussed. Second, the paper focuses on a detailed
10
analysis of the Kansas Supreme Court decision, In re Hendricks, followed by an analysis of the United States Supreme Court majority
11
and dissenting opinions in Kansas v. Hendricks.
Third, the note analyzes the implications of Kansas v.
12
Hendricks, and Kansas v. Crane —two prominent cases regarding
the civil commitment of violent sexual predators on which the
United States Supreme Court has ruled. Specifically, the issues of
sexual dangerousness, and mental disorders, including volitional
abnormality versus emotional abnormality, will be addressed. Implications of the role of the expert witness, especially in distinguishing between volitional and emotional abnormality and their implication in sexual dangerousness, will also be addressed.
Fourth, the note concentrates on new developments in legislation and the ongoing debate between community safety and civil
liberties. The sex offender law of Ohio will be briefly addressed.
Specifically, Ohio’s choice to avoid the civil commitment issue by
implementing a violent sexual predator indictment scheme that allows a judge to sentence a violent sex offender for up to life for his
offense(s) will be discussed and contrasted to civil commitment
schemes. Finally, the author will offer a summary, including a brief
synopsis of the current sex offender research focusing on sex of9. An example of an emotionally impaired sex offender would be an individual with antisocial personality disorder. That is, someone who has the capacity
to choose not to commit a sexual act, but does so, partially due to emotional and
personality issues. An example of a volitionally impaired offender would be a pedophile—someone who, due to a sexual disorder, has a compulsion and volitional
impairment and is unable to refrain from committing sex acts. Many of the individuals residing in civil commitment institutions for sex offenders are a “hybrid,”
suffering from antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy and a paraphilia
(sexual deviancy) making them extraordinary risks for future sexual violence.
10. 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
11. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
12. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
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fender assessment, recidivism, treatment efficacy, and recommendations.
II. HISTORY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS USED TO RESTRAIN
VIOLENT SEXUAL PREDATORS
A. History of Involuntary Commitment
The involuntary commitment of sexual predators has its roots
in the 1930s when state legislatures first introduced procedures for
confinement of “sexual psychopaths, sexually dangerous persons,
13
and sex offenders.” The State of Michigan was the first state to
pass such legislation in 1937. These statutes varied in nature and in
jurisdictional basis. Some required prior criminal convictions for
14
sex offenses. Many laws required different evidence of mental illness, personality disorders, and propensity to sexually re-offend.
Virtually all statutes provided for involuntary civil commitment until the offender was deemed no longer a danger or threat to soci15
ety.
Many of the states labeled these statutes as Mentally Disor16
dered Sex Offender (MDSO) statutes. Sex offender treatment
was emphasized for these offenders because it was believed that this
population was likely to have high rates of recidivism and would be
17
amenable to treatment. Further, some groups of sex offenders,
such as pedophiles, were likely to be ostracized by non-sex offend18
ers and would need segregation within a prison setting. Commitment as a MDSO usually required that the defendant be likely
to commit sex offenses as a result of a “mental disease or defect.”
Many of the states’ original MDSO statutes were construed so
19
that commitment could be of an indefinite duration. Release
from the institution could only be initiated by the superintendent
of the facility and approval by the committing court. Many later
statutes limited the time of confinement to be the maximum time
13. John Kip Cornwell, Article, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil
Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE M ENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 617 (1999).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the defendant could have been sentenced to prison if convicted
criminally.
More than half of the states had implemented sexual predator
legislation by 1960; however, by the end of the 1980s this number
had been cut in half due to concerns regarding the violation of
constitutional rights and the questionable efficacy and success of
20
sex offender treatment. Because of the increase in commitment
of sexual predators and high publicity sex offending cases, the
21
1990s witnessed a resurgence of legislative activity. Many states
implemented statutes authorizing civil commitment of sexually vio22
lent sex offenders. Other states are currently considering implementing civil commitment laws for sex offenders taking into account the goals of treatment and incapacitation of the defendant
without resorting to punishment or imprisonment.
B. State Laws and Rationale
The Washington Sexually Violent Predator Law was the first
23
sexual predator law passed in the United States. It was passed in
1990 and provided the State with procedures for releasing residents
after civilly committed sex offender treatment, such as conditional
release programs or release into the community with no supervi24
sion at all. The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that the
sexual predator provisions of the Washington Sexually Violent
Predator Law were constitutional and did not violate the Ex Post
25
Facto Clause or the prohibition against Double Jeopardy.
20. Cornwell, supra note 13, at 1297.
21. Id. at 1298.
22. States authorizing involuntary commitment for sex offenders include:
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin. States
requiring treatment while sex offenders are serving prison sentences include:
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee and Utah. States requiring treatment during probation or parole include:
Colorado, Indiana, Maine and Ohio. Nevada is the only state that requires lifetime supervision after probation or parole. States requiring treatment as a condition of probation or parole include: Connecticut, Louisiana, West Virginia and
Oregon. John W. Parry, Highlights & Trends, 23 M ENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
LAW REP. 137, 142 (Mar./Apr. 1999).
23. John Q. LaFond, Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence be Normatively Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants
and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 379 (1999).
24. Id. at 379-80.
25. Id. at 386. The State of Washington initiated legislation after defendant,
Earl Shriner, had kidnapped and raped two teenage females, and when paroled,
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The landmark case discussing the civil commitment of sexual
26
predators is Kansas v. Hendricks. Leroy Hendricks had a long and
27
extensive history of diverse criminal sexual offenses. In 1955, he
pled guilty to indecent exposure after exposing his genitals to two
28
young girls. Two years later, he served a jail sentence after convic29
tion for a lewdness crime against a young female victim. In 1960,
he molested two young boys and then served two years in prison,
and while on parole for that offense he molested a seven-year-old
30
girl. He was released from a state hospital in 1965 after sex of31
fender treatment. By 1967, he was again in prison after sexually
32
assaulting a boy and a girl. He refused to participate in sex offender treatment at that time and remained incarcerated until his
33
parole in 1972. Subsequently, he entered and quit a sex offender
34
treatment program. When in the community, his sexual thirst
and desires for children continued leading him to sexually abuse
35
his step-children. He was then convicted of taking indecent liber36
ties with two thirteen-year-old boys in 1984.
Hendricks was scheduled for release from prison after serving
ten years of his sentence, but, prior to his release, Kansas invoked
its newly established “Mentally Abnormal Sexual Predator Stat37
ute.” This statute allowed for the civil commitment of distinct
groups of serious sexual predators who were previously convicted of
a sexually violent offense and completed a prison term for the
38
crime(s). Hendricks communicated to mental health evaluators
raped and brutally assaulted a seven-year-old boy. See id. at 382 & n.52.
26. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129
(state level case).
27. Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight From Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’ Y & L. 250, 252 (1998). The author “considers whether [two] recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Egelhoff v. Montana and Kansas v. Hendricks, signal increasing
social and constitutional acceptance of pure preventive detention of dangerous
people. Hendricks’ implication is that virtually any convicted criminal may be
found mentally abnormal and confined civilly at the end of a prison term.” Id. at
250.
28. Id at 252.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2901 (1994).
38. See Morse, supra note 27, at 252.
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that when he was stressed out, he could not control his urge to molest children, and he guaranteed that the only way he would never
39
molest children was upon his death.
Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the Mentally
40
Abnormal Sexual Predator Statute. He claimed that although the
41
statute protected society, it violated his Due Process rights. He argued that his commitment was not civil in nature, was a form of
punishment and also violated the prohibitions on Double Jeopardy
42
and Ex Post Facto laws.
Before Hendricks, the legal system maintained a delineation be43
tween criminal and civil confinement. Criminal confinement was
justified for defendants that were not seriously mentally ill, but
were both culpable and responsible. Civil confinement was justified for individuals who were severely mentally ill and who were
44
deemed not responsible or culpable. Civil commitment always
balanced the issues of liberty of the defendant, safety of the com45
munity, and dignity.
46
The United States Supreme Court, in Foucha v. Louisiana,
held that a state is required by the Due Process Clause to prove that
there is convincing evidence of two statutory preconditions in or39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 256. See also Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventative Detention, 76 BOSTON U. L. REV. 113, 116-22 (1996); Paul H. Robinson, The
Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 BOSTON U. L. REV. 201, 203
(1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the CivilCriminal Distinction, With Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 78-80 (1996).
44. Morse, supra note 27, at 256.
45. Id.
46. 504 U.S. 71, 74 (1992). The petitioner was acquitted of criminal charges
by reason of insanity and committed to a mental institution for an indefinite period of time. Id. After several years, it was recommended that the petitioner be
discharged or released. Id. A release panel determined that the defendant was no
longer mentally ill. Id. The trial court appointed a sanity commission that was unable to determine whether the petitioner would be a danger to society. Id. The
trial court denied the petitioner’s release and the district court and the State supreme court affirmed. Id. at 75. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, reasoning that the petitioner’s rights under the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment were violated. Id. The Court reasoned the petitioner could only be detained as long as he was mentally ill or posed
a danger to society. Id. The Court held the prosecution failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the petitioner was a danger to society and, therefore,
he was entitled to release. Id.
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der to commit a defendant to a mental hospital in a civil proceeding: 1) the person sought to be committed is mentally ill; and 2)
the person requires hospitalization for his or her own safety and for
47
the protection of others. The Foucha Court held that continuing
to involuntarily commit an insanity acquittee who was no longer
suffering from a mental disorder violates the defendant’s Due
Process rights even if he cannot prove that he is no longer a danger
48
to himself or others. The State cannot civilly commit a responsible person on dangerousness alone, even if he committed dangerous behaviors in the past and continues to pose a dangerous risk to
49
society when released. The involuntary confinement could only
continue until the person regained his sanity or no longer pre50
sented a danger to himself or to others.
Once Foucha regained his sanity, he could no longer be
51
deemed insane or be confined. The United States Supreme
Court concluded that Foucha could not be confined in a mental
facility by the fact that he was dangerous due to his antisocial per52
sonality disorder. The Court reasoned that though Foucha committed a prior criminal act and has antisocial personality disorder
that at times leads to criminal offending, he could not be held in53
definitely against his will. This reasoning would permit the State
47. Anne C. Gillespie, Note, Constitutional Challenges to Civil Commitment Laws:
An Uphill Battle for Sexual Predators After Kansas v. Hendricks, 47 CATH. U. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (1998). The Supreme Court developed a two-pronged test to determine whether a statute was more preventative or punitive. Id. at 1153. The first
prong involved the Court examining whether the legislature intended to create a
civil rather than a criminal law. Id. The second prong evaluated the statue in light
of seven factors traditionally used to determine the law’s punitive effect. Id. See
also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
48. See Gillespie, supra note 47, at 1148.
49. See Morse, supra note 27, at 252.
50. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Under Louisiana law, a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason
of insanity may be committed to a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 80. If a hospital review committee recommends that the acquittee be released, the trial court must
hold a hearing to determine whether he is a danger to himself or others. Id. at 81.
Regardless of whether he is found mentally ill, if there is a finding of dangerousness, he may be returned to the hospital. Id. The State court ordered Foucha, an
insanity acquittee, to return to a mental institution where he was committed, ruling that he was dangerous on the basis of, inter alia, a mental health expert’s testimony that he had recovered from drug induced psychosis, from which he suffered
at the time of commitment. Id. at 82. Testimony indicated that Foucha was “in
good shape” mentally; but he had antisocial personality disorder. Id. This condition is not a mental disease and is not treatable. Id. Foucha had been involved in
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to indefinitely hold any other person whose personality disorder
54
led to criminal conduct. Therefore, any criminal defendant could
55
be held indefinitely even after completing a prison term.
C. Defining Mental Illness
A major issue in the civil commitment legislation of sexual
predators is the definition of mental illness. Historically, courts
have civilly committed individuals who were dangerous to themselves or others, or could not take care of themselves. These indi56
viduals could be civilly probated or “pink slipped.” Other individuals with mental illness and who have committed crimes, but
cannot understand the charges or proceedings against them or are
unable to assist in their defense, have been found not competent to
stand trial and have been civilly committed to a mental hospital for
57
competency restoration. Finally, individuals who have had a mental illness that prohibited them from being able to appreciate right
from wrong at the time of the crime or prevented them from conforming to the standards of law, have qualified for acquittal by Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity, and were civilly committed into a
58
mental health facility.
various altercations and as a result of his repetitive antisocial conduct, the doctor
did not “feel comfortable in certifying that he would not be a danger to himself or
to other people.” Id. The State court of appeals refused supervisor writs. Id. at 71.
The State supreme court affirmed, holding, among other things, that Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) did not require Foucha’s release and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the statutory
provision allowing for confinement of an insanity acquittee based only on dangerousness. Id.
54. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83.
55. Id.
56. See Stephen Morse, Note, Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill: Developments in
the Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1230 (1974); Stephen Morse, A Preference for Liberty:
The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disabled, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54,
59-65 (1982).
57. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972). The Court held that the
State of Indiana could not civilly commit the defendant for an indefinite period of
time based on his incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him. Id.
He could not be held more than a reasonable amount of time necessary to determine whether there was a substantial probability that he would be restored to
competency. Id. at 737. The Court reasoned that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose that they were committed in the first place. Id.
58. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 356 (1983). The Court held that
an individual who was found not guilty by reason of insanity and civilly committed
could not be hospitalized for a longer period of time than the longest prison sentence he could have received if he was found criminally responsible. Id.
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However, in Hendricks, the issues of dangerousness, mental illness, and civil commitment concerning a sex offender were different than with an insanity acquittee. In Hendricks, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
(Kansas Act) violated the prisoner’s substantive Due Process rights
under the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and that a convicted criminal, such as Hendricks, may not be held as a mentally ill
59
person because of criminal dangerousness. Further, as applied to
Hendricks, the constitutionality of the Act depends upon a showing
60
of dangerousness without a finding of mental illness. The Kansas
Act’s definition of abnormality did not satisfy what the Court perceived to be the United States Supreme Court’s “mental illness” requirement and civil commitment context, nor did it address the
61
Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto claims.
In the mid to late 1990s, many states began initiating legislation of sexual predator laws, primarily community notification and
registration of sexual predators. Fewer states developed legislation
of the civil commitment of violent sexual predators. This fact may
be due to the apparently higher stakes regarding the civil liberty issues of civil commitment laws. However, the increasing public
concern about violent sexual offending and the prevention of such
offending has become an important issue for legislatures to consider. Unfortunately, the courts and legislatures have difficulty defining mental illness and dangerousness as pertaining to sex offenders and distinguishing the civil commitment of sex offenders
from traditional civilly committed mentally disordered individuals,
59. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 140. By a four-three vote, the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the Act violated Hendricks’ substantive Due Process rights. Id. at
138. The court did not believe that the Act’s “mental abnormality” provision fulfilled the constitutional “mental illness” requirement. Id. The court believed that
the statute’s preamble rejected the “notion that the targeted group of persons are
mentally ill.” Id. The court was concerned about the legislature’s intent of segregating sexually dangerous offenders from the community. Id. They were concerned that treatment was incidental, and that there was a focus on incapacitation
of the offenders. Id. Further, the court cited that the legislature did not believe
that sex offenders were treatable in the first place and that treatment for this class
of offenders was not available. Id. They reasoned that if there was nothing to
treat, then there was no mental illness. Id. See also Stephan R. McAllister, Sex Offenders and Mental Illness: A Lesson in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’ Y & L. 268, 286 (1998).
60. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138. The State’s own evidence in this case was that
Hendricks was being committed despite not suffering from mental illness. Id.
They believed that his criminal offenses were not due to a mental illness and that
he was not mentally ill. Id.
61. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/2

12

Fabian: Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: "Mental Abnormality"? and
FABIAN_F ORMATTED .DOC

2003]

4/7/2003 11:07 AM

KANSAS V. HENDRICKS, CRANE AND BEYOND

1379

such as insanity acquittees.
III. KANSAS SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with the Hendricks majority that the Mental Abnormality Violent Sexual Predator Law was
62
unconstitutional. Kansas appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. The Kansas Supreme Court’s reasoning was consistent with
Foucha and held that under the Mental Abnormality Violent Sexual
Predator Law there needs to be a finding of mental illness and
63
dangerousness.
The only authority cited by the State was in Young v. Washington, where the Washington Supreme Court addressed the element
64
only of dangerousness, never mentioning mental illness. The
court did not find that “mental illness” had to be medically defined
for the mental illness requirement supporting the Mental
65
Abnormality Violent Sexual Predator Law.
One of the main issues in Hendricks was the court’s definition
of mental illness. The State’s principal evidence concerning
Hendricks’ mental state was the testimony of Charles Befort, the
66
chief psychologist at Larned State Security Hospital. Dr. Befort
testified that in his expert opinion, Hendricks was not suffering
67
from either a mental illness or personality disorder. Dr. Befort
described a person with a personality disorder as an individual who
has a set of characteristics or traits that are deranged; that has traits
or characteristics that tend to result in their behaving in fairly stan68
dard predictable ways through most situations. It becomes a disorder when those traits and characteristics result in the person behaving, thinking, or otherwise acting in such a way that causes them
69
trouble, causes society trouble, or is considered abnormal.
Dr. Befort described persons with antisocial personalities as
“individuals with disregard for social expectations, social values, so62. See Morse, supra note 27, at 252-53.
63. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130.
64. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). The court held that Washington State’s
Community Protection Act of 1990 (codified as RCW § 71.09) for sexually violent
predators violates petitioners’ rights to substantive Due Process and violates the
constitutional prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws and double jeopardy. Id. at
1025.
65. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 137.
66. Id. at 138.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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cial norms, their behavior indicates their disrespect or unconcern
about staying within acceptable boundaries and behavior and consists of traits or characteristics which tend to produce in most situa70
tions predictable but unacceptable or abnormal behavior.” Dr.
Befort testified that “pedophilia is not considered a personality dis71
order but is considered a mental abnormality.” After evaluating
Hendricks, Dr. Befort did not believe Hendricks had a personality
72
disorder. The term “personality disorder” was not defined in the
73
Sexually Violent Predator Act. Dr. Befort did not believe “abnor74
mality” was to be used as a formal diagnosis. The Kansas Supreme
Court reasoned that the term “mental abnormality” is not a psychiatric or medical term, but rather, a legal term defined in the Sexu75
ally Violent Predator Act.
76
Mental illness is defined in the Kansas Act. The Hendricks
court held that the State’s evidence did not support a finding of
“mental abnormality or personality disorder,” as set forth in the
70. Id. at 137. Dr. Befort testified that a pedophile is predisposed to commit
sexual acts with children. He believed it likely that Hendricks would engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence or sexual activity if permitted to do so and “behavior is a good predictor of future behavior.” Id. at 260.
71. Id. at 138.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 592902(b) (1996) provides: “mental abnormality means a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person to
menacing the health and safety of others.” Id. The term “mental abnormality” is
similar to the word “insanity” as it is a legal term, and not a medical or psychiatric
term. Id. at 138. The Kansas Legislature was concerned about a small but dangerous group of sex offenders who do not suffer from a mental disease or defect that
would allow them to be involuntarily civilly committed pursuant to the State’s general involuntary commitment proceedings such as not guilty by reason of insanity.
Id. Sexually violent predators differ from traditional civil committed individuals as
they often suffer from antisocial personality disorder and are not amenable to
treatment and are likely to re-offend. Id. The Legislature reasoned that the recidivism rate of this unique type of offender is so high and the existing traditional
involuntary civil commitment procedure is inadequate to serve both the sex offenders’ treatment needs and society’s safety. Id. The Legislature also reasoned
that the prognosis for treating sex offenders in prison is poor and that the treatment needs are long-term and of different modality than of other traditionally
committed individuals. Id; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2901 (1994).
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(h) (1996) defines mental illness as any person
who: “(1) is suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent that the person
is in need of treatment; (2) lack of capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment; and, (3) is likely to cause harm to others.” Id.
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77

Kansas Act. The court held that the Act violated provisions of the
78
Constitution as set forth in Foucha. To arrive at this conclusion,
the Kansas Supreme Court cited Justice White, writing for the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Foucha, stating that to
indefinitely confine a dangerous individual who has a personality
disorder or antisocial personality, but is not mentally ill, is constitu79
tionally impermissible. In short, to indefinitely confine a dangerous individual who only has a mental abnormality is unconstitutional.
The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that Hendricks was
civilly committed even though he did not suffer from mental illness
and was not mentally ill; but it pointed out that the criminal acts
80
for which he was in prison were not due to mental illness. The
court concluded that the Act was only constitutional if an individual such as Hendricks was dangerous without a finding of mental
81
illness. The court concluded the Act violated Hendricks’ substan82
tive Due Process rights due to the lack of finding mental illness.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires that according to the statute, in
order for an individual to be involuntarily committed for control,
care, and treatment, the State must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual is classified as mentally ill and danger83
ous. Under the Act, the State is required to treat mentally ill individuals who are civilly committed. Under the statute, the State
84
must release them when they are no longer mentally ill.
The Hendricks court cited Foucha where the State of Louisiana
77. Hendricks, 912 P.2d 138.
78. Id.
79. Id. See also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992).
80. Hendricks, 912 P.2d 138.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 139 (Lockett, J., concurring). The concurring opinion by Justice
Lockett concentrated on the importance of the United States Constitution and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Justice Lockett opined
that Hendricks was not mentally ill but had an antisocial personality disorder. Id.
Therefore, he could be civilly committed for treatment and incapacitation in order to protect the community. Id. Hendricks committed sex crimes against children for which he was sentenced to prison. Id. Justice Lockett reasoned that the
State could have incarcerated Hendricks indefinitely, even until his death without
violating the Constitution. Id. He opined that Hendricks, although suffering from
antisocial personality disorder, should have been released since he had served his
full prison term. Id.
84. Hendricks, 912 P.2d 140.
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decided that a defendant like Hendricks, who has committed a
criminal offense and suffers from antisocial personality disorder
that leads to violence and is not treatable, may be deemed mentally
85
ill and civilly committed. In Foucha, the United States Supreme
Court opined that under Louisiana’s rationale, any individual with
a personality disorder that may lead to a criminal offense may be
civilly committed indefinitely even if he were not mentally ill or
86
criminally insane. The Court held that a criminal defendant such
as Hendricks who completed his prison term may not be held as a
87
mentally ill individual based on a risk of criminal dangerousness.
The Supreme Court of Kansas decided that the Act was unconstitutional due to the lack of finding of mental illness required to
civilly commit Hendricks and violation of the Due Process Clause.
The State of Kansas appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.
IV. U.S. SUPREME COURT’ S MAJORITY OPINION OF KANSAS V.
HENDRICKS: THE COURT ADDRESSES “MENTAL ABNORMALITY”
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Kansas Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court ruled
that civil commitment of sexually violent predators did not violate
the substantive Due Process requirements and did not violate the
United States Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause or Ex Post
88
Facto Clause.
The Court reasoned that the definition of “sexually violent
predator” in a statute concerning civil commitment of sexually violent predators requires that a person “has been convicted of or
charged with a sexually violent offense and . . . suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
89
likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.” The
personality disorder is usually antisocial personality disorder, which
is not amenable to “existing mental illness treatment modalities
[which] render them likely to engage in sexually violent behav85. Id. at 139.
86. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 72 (1992).
87. Hendricks, 912 P.2d 140.
88. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997). The Court had a close,
five to four split decision in this case. Id. at 348.
89. Id. at 352. “Mental abnormality” is not defined in the AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL
DISORDERS (4th Ed. 1994) (DSM-IV).
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90

ior.” The defendant must suffer from a mental condition affecting personality and emotional traits or volitional capacity, which
can be precursors for the person to commit sexually violent acts,
91
ultimately placing society in danger.
The definition of “mental abnormality” requires a finding of
both dangerousness and a volitional inability to control danger92
ousness. A civil commitment statute may be upheld where it involves a combination of dangerousness and some type of mental
disorder, which limits involuntary civil commitment to individuals
93
who have a volitional impairment leaving them dangerous.
The Court reasoned that the Kansas Act was similar to other
statutes it upheld as it had a pre-commitment requirement of a
“mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder,” and therefore
narrowed the class of persons who could be eligible for confine94
ment to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.
Further, the Court reasoned that a diagnosis of pedophilia
qualifies as a “mental abnormality” and does not violate Due Proc95
ess rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the pre-commitment
condition of a “mental abnormality” satisfied what the Court perceived to be the “substantive” Due Process requirement that involuntary civil commitment must be predicated on a finding of “men96
tal illness.” The Court determined that because the Act was civil
in nature, the civil commitment of a sex offender did not constitute

90. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351.
91. Id. at 352. The Act does not violate substantive Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 371.
92. Id. at 358.
93. Id. The statute requires more than a propensity or predisposition to violent acts, rather it requires a history of sexually violent behavior and a current
mental condition that creates a likelihood of future sexual violence when released.
Id. at 357. Dangerousness alone is insufficient to justify civil commitment for sex
offenders. Id. at 358. The Court has “sustained civil commitment statutes when
they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’” Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 360. Pedophilia is a recognized category of paraphilia (sexual disorder) which is a disorder characterized by “recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors that involve unusual objects, activities, or
situations and cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994)
(DSM-IV). They include Sexual Masochism, Sexual Sadism, Transvestic Fetishism,
Voyeurism, and Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified. Id.
96. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 2
FABIAN_F ORMATTED .DOC

1384

4/7/2003 11:07 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

97

a criminal proceeding. Because commitment under the Act is not
“punishment” and does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause,
Hendricks’ commitment following the completion of a prison term
98
was allowed.
The Kansas statute’s provision for the civil commitment of a
sexually violent predator does not violate the United States Consti99
tution’s prohibition of Ex Post Facto laws. The Ex Post Facto
Clause “forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a
100
crime already consummated.” The Supreme Court determined
that the Act does not impose punishment and does not have a pu101
nitive purpose. Further, the Court believed that the Act did not
have a retroactive effect. Rather, the Act allows for the civil commitment of a sex offender if that individual currently suffers from a
“mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” and is a dangerous
102
risk to society. The Court opined that the Act “does not criminalize conduct legal before its enforcement, nor deprive Hendricks of
any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes, the
103
Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”
The United States Supreme Court recognized in both
Hendricks and Foucha that freedom from physical restraint and confinement have always been at the center of the liberties protected
104
by Due Process rights from arbitrary governmental action. The
states allow forcible civil commitment of individuals who are unable
to control their behavior and pose a danger to the safety of the
105
community.
The Court has upheld involuntary commitment
statutes as long as the confinement occurs pursuant to appropriate
106
procedures.
97. Id. at 369.
98. Id. See also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966) (holding that
civil commitment following the expiration of a prison term does not offend double jeopardy principles).
99. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
100. Id. at 370. See Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995)
(quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)).
101. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.
102. Id. at 371.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 356; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). The United States Supreme Court has
held that there are times when complete restraints on an individual are necessary
for the common good. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. Otherwise, a society could not exist under safe conditions. Id.
105. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
106. Id. See also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-
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The Act requires a finding of danger to self or others in order
107
to be civilly detained. In order to be committed under civil commitment proceedings, one has to be convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and “suffer from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in the
108
predatory acts of sexual violence.”
Thus, the statute requires
proof of more than a predisposition to violence as it requires proof
of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental state that
creates a likelihood of similar behavior if the person is not de109
tained. A finding of dangerousness alone is not sufficient to jus110
tify indefinite involuntary civil commitment.
The Supreme Court has sustained civil commitment statutes
when they have combined evidence of dangerousness with evidence of some other factor such as “mental illness” or “mental ab111
normality.” The added statutory requirements limit involuntary
civil commitment of sex offenders who suffer from a volitional im112
pairment predisposing them to uncontrollable behavior.
The
Court declared that the pre-commitment requirement of “mental
abnormality” or “personality disorder” is consistent with the requirements of other civil commitment statutes that it has sustained
because the requirement classifies a small class of individuals eligi427 (1979).
107. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
108. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(a) (1994)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 358. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (discussing Kentucky statute permitting commitment of “mentally retarded” or “mentally ill” in
dangerous individuals); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (discussing Illinois statute permitting commitment of “mentally ill” and dangerous individuals).
In Allen, the Court stated that the “State serves its purpose of treating rather than
punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric care and treatment.” Allen, 478 U.S. at
373. The Court held that Allen did not demonstrate that “sexually dangerous persons” in Illinois are confined under conditions incompatible with the State’s asserted interest in treatment. Id. Had he shown “that the confinement of such persons imposes upon them a regimen which is essentially identical to that imposed
upon felons with no need for psychiatric care, this might well be a different case.”
Id. The Court stated that nothing in the record indicated that there were no relevant differences between confinement in a prison versus confinement in a psychiatric facility. Id. at 374. The Court could not say that the conditions of his confinement amounted to punishment and thus rendered criminal the proceedings
which led to confinement. Id. See also Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940) (discussing Minnesota statute permitting commitment
of dangerous individuals with “psychopathic personality”).
112. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
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ble for commitment to those who cannot control their dangerous113
ness.
The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or crimi114
nal is a question of statutory construction. In Allen, the United
States Supreme Court held that proceedings under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were “not criminal” within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory
115
self-incrimination. The Court stated that in addition to proving
the sex offense, the State also needed to prove an existence of a
mental disorder for more than one year and a likelihood of com116
mitting future assaults.
The Court noted that Kansas’ goal of creating a civil proceeding was founded upon its establishment of a civil commitment procedure and placement of the Act within the Kansas probate code,
117
rather than the criminal code. The Kansas Act’s aim is to provide
treatment, not punishment, for persons adjudged sexually danger118
ous and to protect the public from harm. The Act indicates that
“the State cannot file a sexually dangerous person petition under
the Act unless it has already filed criminal charges against the person in question, and thus has chosen not to apply the Act to a larger class of mentally ill persons who might be found sexually dan119
gerous.”
The Act does not change a civil proceeding into a
criminal proceeding.
The Court reasoned that nothing on the face of the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act suggests that the Kansas Legislature
intended to create anything other than civil commitment legisla120
tion. The Court further reasoned that the Act does not implicate
either of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment includ121
ing retribution or deterrence. The Court went on to note that
the Act’s purpose, however, is not retributive because it does not
place responsibility for prior sex offenses on the defendant, and it
does not make criminal conviction a prerequisite for commit122
ment. Rather, evidence of prior sex offenses is used to demon113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 368).
Allen, 478 U.S. at 374.
Id. at 370-71.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
See id. at 361-62.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902 (1996).
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
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strate a “mental abnormality” or future sex offending risk. The
Court reasoned that the absence of the required criminal culpability indicates that the State is not seeking retribution for past con124
duct.
The scienter requirement is traditionally an important ele125
ment when differentiating criminal and civil laws.
The Court
stated that a civil proceeding does not require a finding of scienter
to commit a sexually violent predator. Rather, the commitment
decision is based upon the determination of a “mental abnormal126
ity” or “personality disorder” instead of one’s criminal intent.
Further, the Act does not have a deterrent effect on a person with a
mental abnormality or personality disorder. This is due to the fact
that such persons are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of con127
finement because they cannot control their behaviors. Additionally, the conditions at institutions for civil confinement are essentially the same as the conditions for people involuntarily committed
at most mental hospitals because the former are not placed in a
128
more restrictive environment. Neither party in this case asserted
that people who are civilly committed are subject to punitive conditions, and therefore the Court concluded that civil commitment at
129
such institutions is not “punishment.”
Historically, the Court has held that restraint of a dangerously
mentally ill individual has been regarded as a legitimate, non130
punitive objective.
The potentially indefinite duration of confinement is not associated with a punitive objective, but to the purpose of holding a person until his mental abnormality no longer
131
causes him to be a danger to society. The defendant is allowed
132
immediate release upon showing that he is no longer dangerous.
It was also determined that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act is not necessarily punitive if it fails to offer treatment where
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
126. Id. at 362.
127. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362-63.
128. Id. at 363.
129. Id. The Court stated that if detention for the purpose of protecting society from harm necessarily constituted punishment, then all civil commitment statutes would be considered punishment. Id.
130. Id. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987); Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 165-67 (1963).
131. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363.
132. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2907 (1994)).
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treatment for a condition is not possible or treatment billed possible is merely supplementary, rather than an overriding state con133
cern.
The Supreme Court agreed that the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act’s definition of “mental abnormality” satisfied substan134
tive Due Process requirements. In the past, some states have, in
unique circumstances, allowed for civil commitment of individuals
who are unable to control their behavior and who present a risk for
135
future sex offending. The Kansas Act requires a finding of dangerousness to oneself or others in order to qualify for civil com136
mitment. Civil commitment can be initiated only when a person
“has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense,”
and “suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual vio137
lence.” The statute requires proof of violence, more specifically
sexually violent behavior, and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of future sexual violence. Dangerousness alone,
however, is not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite
138
involuntary commitment. The Court noted that in the past it has
sustained several criminal statutes when the statutes combined
dangerousness with proof of some additional factors such as “men139
tal illness” or “mental abnormality.”
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act is a civil commitment statute requiring a finding of future dangerousness that is associated with the existence of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult for the person to control his
140
behavior. Hendricks argued that the Supreme Court’s past cases
require a finding of “mental illness” for civil commitment and that
“mental abnormality” is not attributed to a mental illness because it
133. Id. at 367.
134. Id. at 356, 371. The Court asserted that while freedom from restraint is a
fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, it is not absolute. While
normally this theory is applied in the criminal arena, the Court acknowledged that
an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical detainment
may be overridden even in the civil context. Id. at 356.
135. Id. at 357.
136. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(a) (1994)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 358.
140. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(B) (1994). The Court stated that the requirement of “mental abnormality” and “personality disorder” follows the requirements of other past statutes the Court has sustained that classify a small
group of persons eligible for detainment who are unable to control their behavior.
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is a term labeled by the Kansas Legislature rather than by the psy141
chiatric community. The Court reasoned that the term “mental
illness” lacks any significance because psychiatrists disagree frequently on what constitutes mental illness. But the Court itself has
used evaluative terms describing mental conditions of those people
142
who could be civilly committed.
Mental health professionals indicated that Hendricks suffered
from pedophilia, a condition mental health professionals qualify as
143
a serious disorder.
While Hendricks admitted that he was
“stressed out and could not control the urge to molest children,”
the Court reasoned that this lack of volition along with the risk of
future sexual recidivism differentiated Hendricks from other dangerous persons who were dealt with through criminal proceed144
ings. The Court held that Hendricks’ diagnosis as a pedophile
qualifies as a mental abnormality under the Act and satisfies Due
145
Process purposes.
Hendricks argued that the indefinite duration of confinement
was punitive, while the Court argued that the purpose of the commitment was to detain a person until the mental abnormality
146
ceased and he is no longer a threat to others. The Court cited
that the maximum amount of time that an individual could be incapacitated pursuant to civil commitment proceedings was one
147
year. If detention continues beyond one year, a court must once
again determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sat148
isfies the same standards as required for the initial detainment.
The Act does not intend to force the defendant to remain confined
any longer than the time during which he suffers from a “mental
abnormality,” rendering him unable to control his dangerous149
ness.
Hendricks argued that the Act is punitive because it does not
141. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358-59.
142. Id. at 360. Mental health professionals often struggle with the requirement that victims of pedophiles be “generally age 13 or younger” because sometimes a defendant will have victims that are twelve and fourteen years of age that
look younger or older than their ages, making a specific diagnosis of Pedophilia
difficult. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
M ANUAL OF M ENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV).
143. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 363.
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2908 (1994); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364.
148. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364.
149. Id.
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150

offer sex offenders any legitimate “treatment.” He argued that
151
confinement under the Act is in essence disguised punishment.
He argued that treatment for his condition and problems is avail152
able but the State has refused and failed to provide it. He argued
that the Legislature believes that sexually violent predators are not
amenable to treatment under the Kansas Involuntary Commitment
Statute and if there is nothing to treat under the statute then there
153
is no mental illness.
The United States Supreme Court historically has held that
under the appropriate circumstances, and when implemented by
adequate procedures and safeguards, incapacitation is allowed un154
der civil law. The Court reasoned that while it has sustained civil
commitment laws that have goals to incapacitate and treat, it has
never held that the Constitution prevents a state from civilly committing individuals who cannot be treated, but who still present a
155
risk to society. The Court reasoned that even if it accepted that
the provision of treatment was not the Kansas Legislature’s “overriding” or “primary” purpose in passing this Act, this does not rule
out the possibility that an alternative objective of the Act was to
150. Id. at 365.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The Court considered the Kansas Supreme Court’s assumption that it
is clear that the overriding concern of the legislature is to continue the
segregation of sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment
with the goal of reintegrating them into society is incidental, at best.
The record reflects that treatment for sexually violent predators is all
but nonexistent. The legislature concedes that sexually violent predators are not amenable to treatment under the existing Kansas involuntary commitment statute.
See id. (quoting Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136). The Court considered it possible to
interpret the Kansas Supreme Court’s assumption that Hendricks’ condition was
untreatable under the existing civil commitment law, and the Act’s purpose was
incapacitation of the offenders. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court stated that absent
a treatable mental illness, Hendricks could not be held against his will. Id.
154. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 373; Salerno, 481
U.S. at 748-49).
155. Id. at 366. In Ethical Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional: Issues Raised
by Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 177 (1997), David L. Shapiro,
Ph.D., noted that Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion raised the issue that a disturbing aspect of the Kansas statute was that Kansas, and other states that might
initiate similar laws, fails to provide the necessary treatment. This form of involuntary detainment could be pursued even if there was no treatment available for this
mental disorder. The purpose of the confinement would be the prevention of antisocial behavior and criminal offending rather than treatment of the defendant.
Id. at 200.
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provide treatment. In addition, it does not require the Court to
156
conclude that the Act was punitive.
The Court stated that it
would be of insignificant worth to mandate treatment as a precondition for civil commitment of the dangerously insane when there
157
were no feasible treatment programs for that population. The
Court further posited that the treatment program initially offered
Hendricks may have been somewhat inadequate, but that he was
158
the first person committed under the Act. Further, Hendricks
was placed under supervision of the Kansas Department of Health
and Social and Rehabilitative Services, housed separately from the
general prison population, and not served by employees of the De159
partment of Corrections.
The Court considered that states have broad discretion and
autonomy in developing treatment programs for mentally ill peo160
ple. In Allen, the Court concluded that “the State serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons
by committing them to an institution specifically designed to pro161
vide psychiatric care and treatment.”
Concurring, Justice Kennedy cautioned against dangers inherent when a civil confinement law is used in combination with a
criminal process, whether or not the law is given retroactive treat162
ment. He also cautioned that the practical effect of the Kansas
163
Act is to perhaps detain the offenders for life. Justice Kennedy
warned that civil commitment should not be used as a replacement
164
or supplement for the criminal process. In his view, the Kansas
156. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 367-68.
159. Id. at 368.
160. Id. See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Court held
that “the State has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of
its responsibilities.” Id. at 317.
161. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 373).
162. Id. at 371-72.
163. Id. at 372. At the time the case was published, Justice Kennedy expressed
concern that because it is impossible to predict future types of treatments for sex
offenders, psychiatrists and other professionals engaged in treating pedophilia
may be reluctant to find measurable success in treatment even after a long period.
Therefore, mental health professionals may not be able to forecast that releasing
the detainee would not put the public in danger. Id.
164. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372. Justice Kennedy asserted that based on
Hendricks’ criminal record, he may have deserved a life term, which may have
been the only sentence appropriate to protect society. The concern is whether it
is the civil or criminal system that should make the initial decision regarding punishment. He stated that if the civil system is used to implement punishment after
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statute requires a finding of dangerousness and adequately defines
165
a mental condition that justifies involuntary commitment. He
argued that although incapacitation is a legitimate goal of both civil
and criminal sentencing, retribution and deterrence are left for the
166
criminal domain only. Kennedy cautioned that if civil confinement of offenders was used as a general deterrent or for retribution
purposes, “or if it were shown mental abnormality is too imprecise
a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is
167
justified, our precedence would suffice to validate it.”
The Court’s majority held that the Kansas Act complied with
the Due Process requirements and did not violate the Double Jeop168
ardy protections afforded by the United States Constitution. In
addition, it emphasized that the Act did not represent a violation of
Ex Post Facto lawmaking for persons who had already been sen169
tenced prior to the imposition of the Act.
V. THE DISSENT OF KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
Justice Breyer dissented from the United States Supreme
Court majority holding. He agreed with the majority on several
points. Justice Breyer agreed that the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act’s definition of a “mental abnormality” solidifies the
substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause. But, according to Justice Breyer, the Act does not provide Hendricks with any
treatment until after he is released from prison, and then only inadequate treatment, which represents an effort not to commit
170
Hendricks civilly, but to inflict further punishment on him. As a
the State makes an unwise plea bargain in the criminal system, then the civil system is not operating appropriately. In essence, in that type of scenario, the civil
system could be adding additional punishment as a means of rectifying a lighter
sentence imposed in the criminal case, and that would be wrong. Id. at 373.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 373.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 371.
169. Id.
170. Id. Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the Due Process Clause
allows Kansas to classify Hendricks, and sex offenders like him, as a mentally ill
and dangerous person for purposes of civil commitment. Justice Breyer argued
that the psychiatric profession classified Hendricks’ problem as a serious mental
disorder, but some professionals debate whether mental disorders such as
paraphilias qualify as “mental illnesses.” He stated that Hendricks’ abnormality
consists not only of a long history of antisocial acts but a specific and serious inability to control his actions. He pointed out that the law has historically considered this mental abnormality similar to the irresistible impulse standard in insanity
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result, Justice Breyer reasoned that the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the application of the Act to Hendricks who committed his
171
crimes prior to the Act.
Justice Breyer posited that the Kansas Act has a resemblance to
civil commitment and traditional criminal punishment, as civil
commitment entails a secure environment similar to imprisonment
and incapacitation. Both of these serve the purpose of criminal
172
punishment, which is to keep society from future harm.
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act imposes its confinement upon an individual who has previously committed a criminal
173
offense, making it similar to criminal punishment. The Act initiates confinement through the use of similar persons involved in the
criminal law procedures arena, such as county prosecutors. Furthermore, it utilizes similar procedures, such as jury trials and psychiatric evaluations for the courts, and similar standards such as
174
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Civil commitment of mentally ill
dangerous persons entails confinement and incapacitation; however, civil commitment based on a constitutional perspective re175
mains civil.
Justice Breyer argued that these obvious resemblances alone cannot prove that Kansas’ civil commitment statute is
criminal; neither can simply injecting the word “civil” into the stat176
ute prove that it is not criminal in nature. Justice Breyer reasoned that when a state believes that treatment for sex offenders
defenses. Justice Breyer stated that because mental health professionals qualify
pedophilia as a serious mental disorder, and Hendricks suffers from irresistible
impulse and cannot control his urge to molest children due to pedophilia, and his
pedophilia presents a danger to society, he believed that Kansas could classify
Hendricks as “mentally ill” and “dangerous.” Id. at 374-77.
171. Id. at 373-74.
172. Id. at 379.
173. Id. at 380.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70). Justice Breyer stated the fact that the
offending behavior initiated civil commitment proceedings through the Act does
not make a vital difference because the Act’s requirement of a prior crime by
eliminating those whose past behavior does not indicate mental illness or future
danger, “may serve an important noncriminal evidentiary purpose.” He believed
the procedures serve an important noncriminal purpose, helping to prevent
judgmental errors that might deprive an offender of his freedom. Id. at 371-372.
Justice Breyer also cited Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739, where the Court held that preventive detention of a sexually dangerous person pending trial did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. The Court did not authorize the indefinite detention based on dangerousness of “insanity acquittees who are not mentally ill but
who do not prove they would not be dangerous to others.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83.
176. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 381.
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does exist, and then combines that belief with a legislatively required delay of sex offender treatment until a person is at the end
of his jail term, thus requiring further determination, this legisla177
tive scheme clearly takes on a light of punitive intent.
The Kansas Supreme Court described the Act’s purpose as segregation of “sexually violent offenders” with their “treatment” being
178
a matter that was “incidental at best.” The Kansas Supreme Court
found that when Hendricks was committed the State had not
funded treatment, it had not entered into treatment contracts, and
179
it had poorly-trained staff to implement treatment. Justice Breyer
stated that the Kansas statute, as it applies to sex offenders who
have already been convicted, “commits, confines, and treats those
offenders after they have served virtually their entire criminal sen180
tence.” The Act seems to postpone the diagnosis, evaluation, and
commitment hearing until just a few weeks prior to the expected
release of a previously convicted sex offender from prison. Justice
Breyer stated that the “time-related circumstance” seemed deliber181
ate.
Justice Breyer questioned why the Act does not commit and
177. Id. Justice Breyer stated that he did not believe that Allen “means that a
particular law’s lack of concern for treatment, by itself, is enough to make an incapacitative law punitive.” In Allen, “the Court considered whether for Fifth
Amendment purposes, legal proceedings under an Illinois statute were civil or
criminal.” Id. at 381. The Illinois law allowed for the confinement of sex offenders who were sexually dangerous and who had committed at least one prior sex
offense, and suffered from mental illness. Id. The Court found that the law was
civil in nature because the State of Illinois had provided treatment for the offenders committed and there was a system in place that allowed the committed detainees to be released as soon as possible after serving their criminal sentence. Id.
The Court found that the proceedings were civil rather than criminal because the
law’s overriding aim was to provide treatment rather than punishment. Id. The
Allen Court focused on using treatment plans to assist in distinguishing between
the civil and criminal purposes of the statute. Id. at 383. Justice Breyer stated that
one would expect legislation motivated with a non-punishing intent that confines
an offender because of a mental abnormality to assist in helping the offender battle his mental illness, assuming there was some effective treatment available. Id.
In contrast, a law that provides confinement that does not include a medically
sound treatment objective obviously represents a more punitive intent. Id. at 381383 (citing Allen at 366 and 370).
178. Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136).
179. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hendricks, 912
P.3d at 131, 136). Justice Breyer stated that at the time, Hendricks’ treatment facility was so poorly staffed that there was “essentially no treatment.” Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the program’s director).
180. Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2903(a)(1)
(1994)).
181. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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require treatment of sex offenders sooner, before they even begin
182
to serve their sentence. He argued that the Act, while stating
183
treatment as a goal, effectively seeks only confinement. Justice
Breyer questioned why legislators, finding that rehabilitating an offender while in prison is unlikely, would create an Act that orders
offenders to remain in that setting for a longer period of time be184
fore beginning treatment. Justice Breyer suggested that if longterm treatment needs were the legislature’s priority rather than
185
punishment, the State would require treatment to commence
soon after the offender was convicted instead of years later near the
186
end of the criminal sentence.
Justice Breyer reasoned that a failure to consider or use alternative methods to achieve a non-punitive goal can assist in showing
187
that the legislature’s purpose was to punish. Conversely, he argued that “[l]egislation that seeks to help the individual offender as
well as to protect the public would avoid significantly greater re188
striction of an individual’s liberty than public safety requires.”
Justice Breyer agreed with the Kansas Supreme Court’s finding that
“the timing of the civil commitment proceeding, and the failure to
consider less restrictive alternatives, . . . suggest[s] . . . that for Ex
Post Facto Clause purposes, the [Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act] (as applied to previously convicted offenders) has a punitive,
189
rather than a purely civil purpose.”
182. Id. Justice Breyer opined that much of the treatment that Kansas offered
can be given at the same time and place in prison where Hendricks served his punishment. Id. at 386. He pointed to the Act’s aim to “respond to special ‘long-term’
‘treatment needs’” as an indication that “treatment should begin during imprisonment.” Id. at 387.
183. Id. at 385-86.
184. Id. at 386.
185. Id. Justice Breyer noted the difference between being untreatable and
being untreated, arguing that where “a State decides offenders can be treated and
confines an offender to provide that treatment, but then refuses to provide it, the
refusal to treat while a person is fully incapacitated begins to look punitive.” Id. at
390.
186. Id. at 387.
187. Id. at 388. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (considering
whether specific prison conditions were meant to be punitive). Justice Breyer suggested less restrictive alternatives to civil commitment such as release from prison
on parole or to a halfway house, which were not considered. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer explained that legislation which focuses on confinement and incapacitation would
probably not concern itself with less restrictive forms of incapacitation. Id.
189. Id. at 389. Justice Breyer found that of seventeen states with similar civil
commitment laws for sex offenders, ten of those state laws require treatment of an
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Justice Breyer argued that as an alternative to civil commitment of sex offenders, a state could sentence its offenders to the
fully authorized sentence, seek consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences, or implement recidivism statutes to lengthen imprison190
ment without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. He argued that
a statute, such as the Kansas Act, that operates retroactively, would
not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause “if the confinement that it imposes
191
is not punishment,” or in other words, it does not in effect impose a
192
second criminal punishment after a first one. Justice Breyer reasoned that the Kansas legislature “did not tailor the statute to fit
193
the nonpunitive civil aim of treatment.”
Justice Breyer stated that the basic substantive Due Process
question is whether the Due Process Clause requires Kansas “to
provide treatment that it concedes is potentially available to a per194
son whom it concedes is treatable.” Justice Breyer considered the
substantive Due Process question with analysis of whether
Hendricks’ confinement violated the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto
195
Clause previously discussed. While he agreed with the majority
opinion that the Act’s definition of “mental abnormality” qualified
under the substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause,
Breyer stated that the Act did not provide Hendricks with any
treatment until after his release from prison, despite the profes196
sional belief his condition could be treated. According to Breyer,
that requirement indicated a punitive rather than civil intent of the
197
legislation, which is in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

offender to begin soon after he has been charged and incarcerated for the sex offense, while the remaining seven state laws involved the delay of commitment until
the offender has served his criminal sentence in prison. Id. at 388-89. He also discussed a Texas statute that substituted civil commitment for criminal punishment
stating that it was not an exercise of state power in a punitive sense and Texas confined “only for the purpose of providing treatment and care designed to treat the
individual.” Id. at 390 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 n.4 (1979)).
190. Id. at 395 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (emphasis in original)
192. Id.
193. Id. at 378.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 373.
197. Id.
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VI. NEW JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS: SELING V. YOUNG
198

In Seling v. Young, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
commitment scheme for violent sexual predators similar to that in
Hendricks as being civil and not criminal. Young, a convicted sex
offender, was committed to a sex offender treatment facility
199
through Washington State’s Community Protection Act of 1990.
The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that Young’s Double
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto claims depended on a determination of
200
whether the Act was civil or criminal in nature. The court held
201
that the Act was civil in nature. In that regard, the court found
202
that the legislature intended to create a civil scheme. “The court
distinguished the goals of incapacitation and treatment from the
203
goal of punishment.”
Young next instituted a habeas corpus action seeking immediate
204
release from his civil confinement in federal district court. The
198. 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
199. Id. at 253. Washington State’s Community Protection Act of 1990, WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09.010 et seq. (1992) (Act) was implemented to address society’s
concerns about sexually dangerous offenders. Seling, 531 U.S. at 254. “One of the
Act’s provisions authorizes civil commitment of such offenders.” Id.
The Act defines a sexually violent predator as someone who has been
convicted of, or charged with, a crime of sexual violence and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in predator acts of sexual violence if not confined in a
secure facility. The statute reaches prisoners, juveniles, persons found
incompetent to stand trial, persons found not guilty by reason of insanity
and persons at any time convicted of a sexually violent offense who have
committed a recent overt act.
Id. (citations omitted). At the commitment hearing, Young’s experts stated that
there was no mental disorder that makes a person likely to sexually re-offend and
there is no way to accurately predict such recidivism. Id. at 255. An expert for the
State testified that Young suffered from both a severe personality disorder and a
severe paraphilia. Id. at 255-56. The State’s expert concluded that his personality
disorder, the length of time during which Young committed his crimes, his reoffending behaviors, his continued denial, and his lack of empathy and remorse
made it more likely than not that he would sexually re-offend. Id. at 256. “The
jury unanimously concluded that Young was a sexually violent predator.” Id.
200. Sering, 521 U.S. at 256.
201. Id. at 256-57. In its reasoning, the court determined that the legislature
intended to create a civil scheme, the Act’s objectives were to provide necessary
treatment for committed offenders with mental disorders and to protect society
from future sex offending resulting from the mental abnormalities of the offenders, and that the Act’s objectives were not focused on criminal responsibility. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 257.
204. Id. at 258. Young claimed that the conditions of his detainment at the
Center were punitive and violated his Due Process rights. Id. at 259. He believed
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court initially granted the writ, concluding that the Act was uncon205
stitutional. While an appeal of the writ was pending, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in Hendricks that civil commitment of
206
sexually violent predators was constitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration
in light of Hendricks. The district court then denied Young’s petition because it concluded that the Washington Act was civil and
thus did not violate Young’s constitutional rights under the Double
207
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The district court held that
the Act was civil in nature, and therefore could not be deemed pu208
nitive as applied to a single individual. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not read Hendricks to preclude
the possibility that the Act could be punitive as applied, and invali209
dated despite its civil nature. The court remanded the case to
the district court in order to determine whether the conditions at
210
the treatment center would render the Act punitive.
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court held that the
211
Washington Act was civil in nature. The Court stated that the Act
provides offenders with the right to “adequate care and individual212
ized treatment.” The determination of whether a treatment facility is operating in accordance with state law is to be made by the
213
Washington courts.
The Court indicated that because the Act
he had been confined in a manner harsher and more restrictive than those placed
on individuals in “true” civil commitment facilities or even criminal prisoners. Id.
Young pointed out that the Center was located entirely inside the perimeter of the
larger Department of Corrections (D.O.C.) facility and in turn relied on the
D.O.C. for all of its essential services, tying it even closer to a prison-like criminal
setting. Id. at 259.
205. Id. at 258.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 259.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 260.
211. Id. In the dissent, Justice Stevens discussed Young’s detailed allegations
concerning both the absence of treatment for his alleged mental illness and the
obvious punitive nature of the surroundings of the treatment facility. Sering, 521
U.S. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting). If proved, those allegations could establish
that people detained pursuant to the statute are treated like those imprisoned for
violations of criminal laws, and even that often times the treatment they receive is
considerably worse. Id. If the allegations were true, the statute should be characterized as a criminal law in light of the purposes and principles of the Constitution. Id.
212. Sering, 521 U.S. at 265 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §71.09.080(2) (Supp.
2000)).
213. Id.
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was civil in nature and designed to incapacitate and treat detainees,
Due Process required that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
214
for which persons are committed.
VII. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’ S MAJORITY OPINION: KANSAS
V. CRANE: THE COURT ADDRESSES “EMOTIONAL ABNORMALITY”
In Hendricks, the Court addressed the volitional component of
sex offending. Leroy Hendricks had a volitional mental abnormality, pedophilia, in which he had an insatiable desire for children,
which was essentially an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse. In
that case, the Court did not have to address the issue of emotional
abnormality or personality disorders, which led an individual to
commit sexually violent acts due to Hendricks’ sexual disorder that
was the impetus of his criminal behavior.
215
Recently, in In re Crane, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court in Hendricks found an
implied volitional requirement in the Act in order to find the law
216
constitutional. The Kansas Supreme Court stated that if an offender can control his actions, then his substantive Due Process
rights are violated because the law is not so narrowly suited to restrict the liberty of avolitional or emotionally impaired sexually
217
dangerous offenders. Additionally, the State may not have a similar objective in detaining sexual offenders with some volitional control over their actions because there is a question of whether these
offenders present the same threat to society as avolitional sexually
dangerous offenders. The former may be more appropriately dealt
with using traditional measures, such as criminal confinement and
218
punishment.
In Crane, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that the Act does
not formally require an inability to control one’s actions as a prerequisite to civil commitment; rather, the Act also provides for the
commitment of those offenders who suffer from an “emotional” or
214. Id.
215. 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000).
216. Id. at 290. See Maureen O’Connor & Danny Krauss, Legal Update: Constitutional Challenges to Sexually Violent Predator Laws Post Kansas v. Hendricks, AM.
PSYCHOL.-LAW SOC’ Y NEWS, Div. 41, American Psychology Association, Vol. 21, No.
2, (Spring 2001).
217. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 288.
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219

a “volitional” impairment. The Kansas Supreme Court held that
the SVP law was unconstitutional when applied to Michael Crane,
since, unlike Leroy Hendricks, Crane could exert some control
220
over his behaviors.
Crane argued whether it is permissible to commit him as a
sexual predator without proving he was unable to control his sexu221
ally dangerous behavior. The trial court held that the commission of a sexual offense and the existence of a mental disorder or
personality disorder that made Crane more likely to re-offend are
222
separate concepts and are not interdependent. The court cited
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hendricks that the State must
only prove the existence of a mental abnormality that makes the
223
defendant more likely to sexually re-offend. The district court
held that even though experts might agree that Crane’s mental
disorder does not impair his volitional control where he cannot
control his behavior, the Kansas Act does not specifically require
224
this element to be proven. The Kansas Supreme Court stated
219. Id.
220. Id. at 290. The Kansas Supreme Court stated that the Act may impact the
United States Supreme Court’s ex post facto and double jeopardy analyses. Id. at
291. In making this evaluation, the court relied on the uncontrollability of the offender’s behavior in determining whether the commitment under the Act was civil
in nature. Id. This analysis was similar to the one used by the Court in analyzing
the substantive Due Process argument. Id. The court stated that the objective of
the Act was not based on punishment or deterrence but instead on protection of
society and treatment as a secondary concern. Id. at 292. In 1993, Michael Crane
was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing himself to another person. Id. at 286. His convictions of attempted aggravated criminal sodomy, attempted rape, and kidnapping that occurred the same day as the above incident,
were reversed. Id. However, Crane was convicted of aggravated sexual battery for
grabbing a store clerk from behind while exposed, and with his hands squeezed
her neck, ordering her to perform oral sex on him while telling her he was going
to rape her. Id. Crane ran out of the store before completing these sex acts. Id.
At the commitment trial to determine whether Crane was a sexually violent predator, psychologist Douglas Hippe concluded that Crane suffered from antisocial
personality disorder and exhibitionism, but that exhibitionism alone would not
qualify him as a sexual predator. Id. at 286-87. Citing Crane’s increasing intensity
of sex offending, disregard for others, aggressiveness and daring behaviors, Hippe
opined that Crane should be labeled a predator due to the combination of antisocial personality and exhibitionism. Id. at 287.
221. Id. at 287. Crane argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the Supreme Court’s holding does not require proof of volitional impairment that prevents him from controlling his sexually deviant behavior, when the impairment is a
personality disorder. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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that the Kansas Act does not expressly prevent detainment absent a
225
finding of uncontrollable or volitional dangerousness.
Crane continued to argue that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hendricks “read a volitional impairment requirement into the Kansas Act as a condition of its constitutionality” and that there needs
to be a volitional impairment when the person’s mental disorder is
226
a personality disorder rather than a mental abnormality.
The
Kansas Supreme Court held that the U.S. Supreme Court opinion
in Hendricks does not formally include “consideration of willful behavior.”227 The court held that commitment under the Kansas
Act—Which defines mental abnormality as including behavior that
is controllable and does not address behavior based on a personal228
ity disorder —is unconstitutional without a finding that the defendant is volitionally impaired and cannot control his sexually
229
dangerous behavior.
The U.S. Supreme Court considered the State’s argument that
the Kansas Supreme Court read Hendricks incorrectly by requiring
proof that a sex offender is completely unable to control his behav230
ior. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Kansas that the decision in Hendricks did not require “total or complete lack of con231
trol.”
The Supreme Court reasoned that “insistence upon
225. Id. at 289. The Kansas Supreme Court stated that the Kansas Act indicated a person could be committed if he has a sex offense or sex offense history,
and is likely to engage in future sex offending behaviors. The legislature stated
volitional capacity is the “capacity to exercise choice or will” and if this choice is
affected, one could have problems controlling their behavior. Emotional capacity
was identified as an “alternative faculty that could be affected by condition.” The
court reasoned that defining emotional capacity in addition to volitional capacity
regarding mental abnormality, was to include a source of bad behavior in addition
to inability to control one’s behavior. The legislature included personality disorder as an alternative to mental abnormality, but did not define personality disorder. Id.
226. Id. at 290.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. The court stated that the personality disorder’s sufficiency for commitment standards has to be a question for the jury and they were not instructed
to make a finding as to his inability to control his behavior. Id. The court cited
Justice Thomas’ opinion in Hendricks, “a civil commitment must limit involuntary
confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control.” Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
230. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 410-11 (2002).
231. Id. The Court indicated that in Hendricks the Act required a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it “difficult, if not impossible, for
the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.” Id. at 410. The Court
noted that “the word ‘difficult’ indicates that the lack of control element was not
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absolute lack of control would risk barring the civil commitment of
232
highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.”
However, the Court did not agree with the State regarding its objective in permitting detainment of a dangerous sexual predator
233
without any finding of a lack of control. The Court held that to
justify civil commitment, a defendant must have some volition. It is
not enough that a defendant has difficulty controlling his behav234
ior.
The State pointed out that the Kansas Supreme Court allowed
the detainment of dangerous sex offenders who suffered from
“mental abnormality” characterized by an “emotional” deficit and
235
who did not suffer from a “volitional impairment.” Contrarily,
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that Hendricks only addressed voli236
tional impairment rather than “emotional impairment.”
The
Court cited a history of civil commitment cases of dangerous of237
fenders that had difficulty controlling their behaviors. However,
neither Hendricks nor Crane, considered whether detainment of sex
offenders based only on “emotional” impairment was unconstitu238
tional.
Ultimately, the Court decided that one can be civilly
committed as long as there is proof of some inability to control the
sexually dangerous behavior, whether that inability is due to a voli239
tional or emotional impairment.
In the dissent, Justice Scalia contended that the Act allows for
the detainment of convicted sex offenders if the State proves that
the defendant suffers from: (1) a “mental abnormality” affecting
his “emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to
absolute.” Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 413.
234. Id. The Court indicated that when reviewing all factors, including the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and severity of the mental abnormality, the proof
of an individual’s serious difficulty in controlling behavior must be adequate to
distinguish a dangerous sex offender, whose serious mental illness makes him eligible for civil detainment from a person who is dangerous in the average criminal
case. Id. See also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58; Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71, 8283 (1992).
235. Crane, 534 U.S. at 414.
236. Id. Hendricks addressed pedophilia, which involved a lack of control. Id.
237. Id. at 415. The Court has never addressed the issues of volitional, cognitive, and emotional impairment together as it applies to civil commitment. Id.
238. Id. The Court vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case. Id.
239. See id. at 415 (holding the Hendricks court did not have occasion to consider whether emotional impairment alone is enough to commit).
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commit sexually violent offenses,” or (2) a “personality disorder,” as
long as either places the defendant at a greater risk of sexually re240
offending. Scalia disagreed with the majority’s opinion citing the
Kansas Act’s language that requires a finding of future dangerousness, that the committed defendant is “‘likely to engage in repeated
acts of sexual violence’ and then connects that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behav241
ior.”
Kansas’ Act allows for detainment of offenders upon the finding that a cause of the likelihood of re-offending is a “mental ab242
normality” or “personality disorder.”
Therefore, persons detained under the Act suffer from a “mental abnormality” or a
“personality disorder” that prevents them from controlling their actions. It is presumed that these persons are not deterred by the
243
threat of detainment. However, Scalia did not read the Act to say
that “mental abnormality” contains a requirement of inability to
244
control.
He quoted the Hendricks Court, stating that the precommitment requirement of either a “mental abnormality” or “per240. Id. Scalia cites that one expert concluded that exhibitionism alone would
not qualify for predator status, but when combined with antisocial personality disorder, there was sufficient evidence for predator classification. Further, the State’s
expert indicated that Crane’s disorder did not impair his volitional control to the
degree he could not control his sexually dangerous behavior. Id. at 416-17.
241. Crane, 534 U.S. at 418-19 (emphasis in original) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S.
at 358 and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902 (b) (1994)). Scalia stated that the majority
relied on the italicized language to require a separate finding of inability to control behavior. Id. at 419.
242. Id. at 420. Scalia noted that normal offenders make a conscious choice to
re-offend and are therefore open to deterrence provided through criminal proceedings and punishment, however, his concern is that defendants who are civilly
committed due to their mental illness that is based on an affliction and not a conscious choice, are unlikely to be deterred under the Act. Id.
243. Id. at 421. Some may argue that civilly committed sex offenders who are
dangerous and are committed due to a personality disorder, such as antisocial personality disorder, may be deterred. Many psychopaths, due to low cortical arousal
and lack of anxiety and an inability to internalize punishment for example, are not
deterred by punishment. The question is whether they cannot control their behavior due to a personality disorder. Scalia stated that the Court in Crane reopened a question of whether the Act cannot be applied because it allows for the
commitment of offenders who have mental illnesses other than volitional problems. Id. The Hendricks Court did not consider that question.
244. Id. at 419. Scalia believed the Court was trying to say that the Act “required finding of a causal connection between the likelihood of repeat acts of sexual
violence and the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ necessarily establishes ‘difficulty if not impossibility’ in controlling behavior.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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sonality disorder” is consistent with the Court’s previous decisions
regarding the confinement of dangerous offenders who are unable
245
to control their behavior.
Further, Scalia argued that the Hendricks opinion clearly addressed that the Act includes individuals who have personality dis246
orders. Scalia asserted that “because Hendricks involved a defendant who indeed had a volitional impairment (even though we
made nothing of that fact), its narrowest holding covers only that
application of the SVPA, and our statement that the SVPA in its en247
tirety was constitutional can be ignored.” Scalia proposed that
distinguishing between volitional, cognitive, and emotional issues
regarding civil commitment does not make sense because an offender may be able to exercise volition but continue to be danger248
ous; therefore, the offender should not be allowed in society.
While Scalia agreed with the Court’s opinion in Hendricks that
to be labeled a sexual violent predator, a jury would have to find
that the defendant had been convicted of a sex offense(s), is suffering from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and has a
condition that renders him likely to commit future sex offenses, the
Justice believed that the majority in Crane added another requirement—that the offender suffers from an inability to control his be249
havior. Scalia questioned how anyone can qualify or quantify for
245. Id. at 419 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). Scalia believed that the
existence of a mental abnormality or emotional or personality disorder that causes
a likelihood of sex offending itself creates the requirement of “difficulty or impossibility” of control. Id. at 420. He further argued the jury verdict in Hendricks did
not provide a separate finding of “difficulty, if not impossibility, to control behavior.” Id. This finding, Scalia argued, is included within the finding of causing future dangerousness. Id. (emphasis in original).
246. Id. at 421. Scalia again cited the Kansas Act, which includes emotional
and volitional impairments. Id.
247. Crane, 521 U.S. at 422 (emphasis in original). Scalia argued that “the narrowest holding in Hendricks affirmed the constitutionality of commitment on the
basis of the jury charge given in that case (to wit, the language of the SVPA); and
since that charge did not require a finding of volitional impairment, neither does
the Constitution.” Id. Scalia points out that the Court did uphold the constitutionality of the Act and did not deny Hendricks his Due Process although allowing
for a precommitment requirement of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.” Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
248. Id. at 422.
249. Id. at 423. Scalia stated that this “inability is not an utter inability, or an
inability in a particular constant degree, rather an inability in a degree that will
vary in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis,
and the severity of the mental abnormality itself.” Id. Scalia does not believe the
Court’s decision offers sufficient guidance to trial courts when instructing juries
on volitional issues and inability to control. Id.
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the jury what the “inability to control” based on a psychiatric diag250
nosis and “severity of mental abnormality” means.
Scalia concluded that the jury determined that Crane suffered from antisocial
personality disorder and exhibitionism, and that these mental disorders rendered him likely to sexually re-offend, which is all that
251
both the United States Constitution and the Kansas Act require.
VIII. A SAMPLING OF PERTINENT STATE SUPREME COURTS’
APPROACHES TO CIVIL COMMITMENT AND
SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTES
252

In 1999, in In re Linehan (Linehan IV), the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a similar issue to the one in Crane, concerning a defendant’s volition or lack thereof, over his sexual be253
haviors and how this should relate to civil commitment.
The
250. Id. Scalia sarcastically asked the question of how an attorney should
quantify Mr. Crane’s inability to control his violence, “Ladies and Gentlemen of
the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is 42% unable to control his penchant for sexual violence.” Id. at 423-24.
251. Id. at 425. Scalia was clear in expressing his belief that the majority’s
“holding would make bad law in any circumstance.” Id. at 424.
252. In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
253. Id. Dennis Linehan began sexually offending as a teenager and at age
fifteen he sexually assaulted a four year-old girl, at nineteen he had intercourse
with a thirteen year-old female, at twenty-two he engaged in window-peeping, and
later that year he repeatedly raped a female. At twenty-three, he sexually assaulted
and killed a fourteen year-old girl. He subsequently committed two more sexual
assaults. He was convicted on those charges but later escaped from a minimumsecurity facility and assaulted a twelve year-old girl while he was out on that case.
Ultimately, he was sentenced to forty years in prison, but in 1992, before the end
of his prison term, the State moved to civilly commit him under the Psychopathic
Personality Commitment Act (PP Act). M INN. STAT. §§ 526.09-10 (1992). In order
to be committed under the PP Act, a person must evince an “utter lack of power to
control his sexual impulses.” Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that an appellant could not be committed under the PP Act if the State failed to present
“clear and convincing evidence that appellant has an utter lack of power to control
his sexual impulses.” Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting In Re Linehan, 518
N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (Linehan I)). The amended PP Act was then revised into what is now known as the Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act (SPP Act).
The SPP Act included among other factors, “an utter lack of power to control the
person’s sexual impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.” Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Act (SPP Act) of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995
Minn. Laws 5, 6 (codified as amended at M INN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18b
(1998)). Upon his release, the State legislature passed the SDP Act of August 31,
1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 7-8 (codified as amended at M INN. STAT. §
253B.02, subd. 18c (1998)). Lineham IV, 594 N.W.2d at 869. See also State ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 555 (1939), aff’d, 309
U.S. 270 (1940).
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court held in an earlier decision, entitled, In re Linehan (Linehan
254
III), that an utter inability to control one’s sexual impulses was
not vital to narrowly fitting the State’s Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act (SDP Act) to meet substantive Due Process requirements, and
that differentiating between sexual offenders with and without
255
mental disorders did not violate equal protection. The appellant
argued in this case that the Minnesota SDP Act does not limit the
group of targeted offenders because it eliminates the need to prove
that a person has an utter inability to control his sexual impulses
256
before permitting civil commitment. Appellant raised the question of “whether Hendricks require[s] a complete or, at a minimum,
a partial lack of volitional control over sexual impulses in order to
narrowly tailor a civil commitment law to meet substantive Due
Process standards and whether the SDP Act satisfies the substantive
257
Due Process standards set out in Hendricks.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court cited Hendricks, where the
United States Supreme Court limited “involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering
258
them dangerous beyond their control.” The Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that the SDP Act was enacted to protect society
from sex offenders with mental disorders “who retain enough control
254. 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996).
255. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 870 (citing Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 182-87).
The district court considered Linehan’s current aggressive behavior, antisocial
personality disorder, and his lack of control and sexual impulses to be risk factors
in determing future sexual behavior. The defendant was ordered for commitment. Id.
256. Id. at 872. The SDP Act defines a sexually dangerous person as one who:
1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct; 2) has manifested a sexual,
personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and 3) as a result is likely to
engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. Id. at 874. Nowhere in the SDP Act did
the legislature set forth the “utter inability test.” However, the legislature stated
that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control his sexual impulses.” Id. at 875 (citing M INN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (a) (1998)).
257. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court was concerned with the United States
Supreme Court’s definition of forcible civil detainment in defined situations of
“people who are unable to control their behavior and thereby pose a danger to the
public health and safety.” Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357). The Minnesota
Supreme Court pointed out that in Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court
stated that a person may be civilly committed if he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder “that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the
person to control his dangerous behavior.” Id. at 873. The Minnesota Supreme
Court indicated that this language in Hendricks “does not require an utter lack of
control over harmful behavior, but rather a lack of adequate control over harmful
behavior.” Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
258. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 873 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).
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to ‘plan, wait, and delay the indulgence of their maladies until pre259
sented with a higher probability of success.’” The court held that
the SDP Act permits the commitment of individuals who do not
lack control over their harmful sexual impulses but have a degree
of volitional impairment such that they are “unable to control their
260
dangerousness.” The added requirement of being unable to control dangerousness is similar to the requirements set forth in
Hendricks. The court only reviewed the specific issue of whether the
appellant demonstrated a lack of adequate control over his sexually
harmful behavior as the district court had taken into consideration
261
all other commitment elements in Linehan IV.
In his dissent, Justice Page indicated that the fundamental issue before the court was whether it was in violation of a sexual
predator’s Due Process rights if the State indefinitely confined
262
them in a civil commitment facility under the Minnesota statute.
Justice Page pointed out that the majority determined that the only
constitutional “check” on the State when dealing with the indefinite confinement of such individuals is a demonstration of their fu263
ture dangerousness. Justice Page stated that the majority failed in
259. Id. at 875 (emphasis added) (citing Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 182 (quoting In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 318 [hereinafter Linehan II])).
260. Id. (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 and Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 182).
261. Id. at 876. The court referred to the district court’s findings in drawing
the conclusion that appellant lacked adequate control over his sexual impulses
and suffered from antisocial personality disorder and impulsivity. The court reviewed the case only under the analysis of whether the appellant demonstrated a
lack of adequate control over his sexually harmful behavior and ultimately upheld
appellant’s civil commitment under the SDP Act. Id. at 877-78.
262. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 878; M INN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998).
The question was specifically related to the concern for the rights of sexual predators who do not have a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond
their control. Id.
263. Id. Justice Page stated that the United States Constitution requires more
than a mere consideration of a person’s future dangerousness. Id. In upholding
the SDP Act, Justice Page stated that the court is simply acting as an arm of the legislature in violation of the court’s duty “to provide safeguards against the State’s
improper use of civil commitment as a constitutionally invalid form of preventative
detention.” Id. He continued that while the aim of the PP Act is to protect the
public from sexually dangerous people who are unable to control their sexual behavior, the SDP Act is more far-reaching in that it is drafted to permit the indefinite commitment of both those individuals covered by the PP Act, and all other
sexually dangerous people as well. Id. at 879. He asserted that under the SDP Act,
no sexually dangerous person could be excluded. Id. Justice Page criticized the
majority’s effort to say that the requirement of establishing that an individual has a
“lack of adequate control” over his sexual behavior coupled with dangerousness
provided the requisite constitutional safeguards for individuals. Id. at 880-81. Justice Page referred to the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hendricks that the
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its assessment of the mental illness prong of the SDP Act by not
even considering that the mental illness or mental abnormality
must cause the individual’s inability to control their harmful sexual
264
conduct, as stated in Hendricks.
The majority’s interpretation of the SDP Act would allow the
State to lock up anyone whose mental abnormality makes them
dangerous, whether or not they are dangerous beyond their con265
trol.
Justice Page disagreed with the majority’s broadening of
“the class of persons eligible for confinement” by allowing civil
commitment of individuals suffering from a mental illness or men266
tal abnormality who are not dangerous beyond their control. Justice Page was dissatisfied with the majority’s “lack of adequate control” standard because it failed to provide a definition of what “lack
267
of adequate control” means. Justice Page stated that the court’s
“lack of control” standard does not answer the question of which
offenders with a mental disorder are so volitionally impaired they
268
cannot control their dangerousness. Justice Page argued that the
individual’s mental illness or mental abnormality must make them unable to control their dangerousness before civil commitment can occur. Id. He pointed out
that the Court treated “mental illness,” “mental abnormality,” and “inability to
control” as synonymous with one another. Id. at 880.
264. Id. at 881.
265. Id.
266. Id. Justice Page stated the majority’s requirement of “lack of adequate
control” over their sexual behavior was ridiculous since all sex offenders appear to
“lack adequate control.” Id.
267. Id. Justice Page cites the majority’s various phrases when referring to lack
of control including: “some degree of volitional control,” “a degree of volitional
impairment,” and “a lack of adequate control.” Justice Page continued to cite the
Supreme Court in Hendricks, stating that the State must prove that the “offender is
unable to control his dangerousness.” Id. Justice Page stated that the record indicated Linehan had control over his sexual behavior as his masturbation practices
were described as both impulsive acts and also concealed misconduct. Id. at 883.
In essence, Linehan may have had volitional impairment but not to the extent that
he was dangerous beyond his control. Id.
268. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 881. Justice Page notes that traditionally courts
have rejected a doctrine of diminished capacity because it “inevitably opens the
door to variable or sliding scales of criminal responsibility, but the law recognizes
no degree of sanity.” Id. Justice Page stated:
Yet, while this court does not allow a defendant to use diminished capacity to avoid criminal responsibility, by its decision today it will allow the
state to use diminished capacity’s mirror opposite, ‘lack of adequate control’ to civilly commit an individual. If there is ‘no twilight zone’ between
abnormality and insanity and an ‘offender is wholly sane or wholly in
sane,’ then what does lack of adequate control mean?
Id. Justice Page believed that the majority’s interpretation of the SDP Act would
possibly allow the State to civilly detain any group of offenders who have a record
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majority implicitly ruled that every individual who suffers from a
mental illness or mental abnormality causing him a volitional impairment indicating future dangerousness is dangerous beyond
269
control.
270
Comparatively, in In the Matter of the Commitment of W.Z., the
Superior Court of New Jersey addressed the issue centering upon
the differentiation of a sex offender who has volitional control
problems, commits sex offenses, and recruits victims, and an offender “who is situational and opportunistic but not selective to a
271
particular type of victim.” In this case, the appellant argued that
civil detainment must be limited to offenders who completely lack
272
volitional control of their violent sexual impulses.
In this case, Dr. Kenneth McNiel at the Adult Diagnostic
of harmful and dangerous behavior, suffer from some kind of mental illness, and
who will likely be dangerous in the future. Id. at 881. To illustrate his point, Justice Page hypothesized that a youth who has Conduct Disorder, and is sexually
dangerous when young is likely to develop Antisocial Personality Disorder as an
adult, which would result in “‘a pervasive pattern’ of the ‘violation of the rights of
others’” and the youth could therefore be civilly detained under the majority’s interpretation of the SDP Act because he would be likely to engage in dangerous
conduct in the future. Id.
269. Id. at 882. Justice Page argued that the SDP Act specifically states that an
offender’s inability to control his sexual impulses is not the issue, rather, the State
must prove that the defendant “lacks adequate control” without providing for a
specific definition of lack of control. Id. at 884. Justice Page argued that the Act
was unconstitutional because the State does not have to prove that the person to
be detained “has an inability to control their sexual impulses,” rather, the Act is
applicable to all offenders despite their ability to control their dangerous sexual
offending patterns. Id. at 885.
270. 773 A.2d 97 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
271. Id. at 103-04. This case was an appeal from a judgment rendered under
the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), sections 30:4-27.24 to 27.38
of the New Jersey Statutes, under which W.Z. was committed to the special offenders unit at the Northern Regional Unit (NRU) in Kearny, New Jersey. Id. at 100.
The judge found that W.Z. was a threat to society as a result of his mental abnormality, which indicated a risk to commit future sex offenses. Id. The SVPA can be
employed with sex offenders who have volitional control of their sexual impulses,
but do not have the emotional capacity to control their sexual dangerousness. Id.
272. Id. W.Z. was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for fourth degree
sexual contact, then five years for making terroristic threats, and an additional five
years for aggravated assault. He served his maximum sentence and was temporarily committed to Northern Regional Unit (NRU). Id. at 101. He had an extensive
juvenile and adult criminal history, including attempted sexual assault and criminal sexual contact as an adult. Id. His first sexual offense occurred when he was
sixteen years of age, while his second sexual offense occurred when he was about
twenty-three years of age when he physically and sexually assaulted the victim. Id.
Most recently, he was convicted of sexually assaulting a woman at a train station.
He had a total of fifteen institutional disciplinary charges during his five-year
prison term including some assaults and segregation. Id.
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Treatment Center in Avenel diagnosed W.Z. with “antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic features,” violence, potential an273
ger towards women, and a “lack of empathy for others.” Three
other mental health professionals diagnosed him with antisocial
274
personality disorder. Dr. Jackson Bosley testified that the defendant was not suffering from a paraphilia or sexual compulsion, and
that he had made a conscious decision to sexually assault his victims, although he did not have the ability to control his antisocial
275
behavior and posed a continued risk to women.
Dr. Anthony
D’Urso testified that the central issue focused on making a distinction between a sex offender who has an impulse to sexually offend
and seeks out victims and a sex offender who is situational and op276
portunistic but does not actively select a particular type of victim.
Dr. D’Urso testified that the latter type of offender typically does
not engage in more frequent sexually violent offenses than any
277
other sorts of crimes.
Judge Freedman indicated that based on the evidence, it was
clear that W.Z. had a mental abnormality that does affect his emotional capacity so as to predispose him to commit acts of sexual violence, despite the unanimous testimony of three mental health ex278
perts who said he could control his sexual acts.
The judge
concluded that W.Z. had committed a sex crime, suffered from a
273. Id. at 102. Dr. McNiel indicated that the etiological factors leading to the
commission of the offense included antisocial personality, violence and impulsivity
rather than being based on sexual compulsions. Id. W.Z. did not engage in repetitive and compulsive sexual behavior and Dr. McNiel concluded that he was not
eligible for sentencing under the SVPA. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. In re W.Z., 773 A.2d at 103-04.
277. Id. W.Z. argued that he did not suffer from a sexual compulsion and
lacks a deviant sexual arousal pattern, but because he had control over his behavior, he did not qualify under the SVPA. Id. at 104. No evidence was presented
that he suffered from a paraphilia, and he argued under the United States Constitution, in order to be civilly detained as a sex offender, the State must prove the
offender was not able to control his sexually dangerous behavior. Id. The court
rejected this argument, and the judge argued that the SVPA is limited to individuals who cannot control their sexual impulsivity and/or compulsions. Id. Dr.
D’Urso stated that W.Z. was antisocial but did not have obsessive and compulsive
sexual thoughts, nor did he suffer from any particular thought disorder that would
prevent him from controlling his impulses. Id. at 103. He had a personality disorder but that disorder is not the same type of volitional behavior that mood or psychotic disorders represent. Id. Dr. D’Urso distinguished antisocial personality
from mental incapacity as descriptive of the way a person acts in society as opposed
to a biochemical disorder. Id.
278. Id. at 104.
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mental or personality disorder and was likely to sexually re-offend
279
in the future.
W.Z. argued that the Constitution requires that a sex offender
must suffer from a volitional problem in which he is unable to con280
trol his sexual behavior in order to qualify under the SVPA. W.Z.
contended that he was not subject to commitment under the SVPA
based on the expert testimony at his initial commitment hearing
281
because he did in fact have control over his sexual impulses.
The State considered the language of the SVPA allowing for
the commitment of a sexual predator even if he does not suffer
from a complete lack of volitional control. The State argued that
Hendricks did not require a complete lack of volitional control and
282
that the SVPA follows the reasoning in Hendricks. The SVPA provides that the courts consider the risk of an individual to commit
sex crimes in the future and do not formally consider whether the
283
violence is caused by emotional or volitional impairments. All of
the experts were in agreement that if he desired, W.Z. had the volitional capacity to control his sexual impulses, but that he chose not
284
to control those urges.
The only question before the court in In re W.Z. was whether
the State was prohibited from involuntarily committing a sex of285
fender who could control his acts, but chooses not to. The Superior Court of New Jersey found the language in Hendricks to be
mildly confusing due to the case’s implication that the mental abnormality component was specifically limited to volitional impair286
ment. The court did not agree with W.Z.’s argument that according to Hendricks, involuntary commitment must be limited to those
individuals who lack control over their actions and who are pre-

279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 105.
283. Id.; N.J. STAT. § 2C:47-3(b) (2002) (requiring a finding of “repetitive and
compulsive behavior”). “The absence of such language in the SVPA evinces the
legislature’s intent that commitment for control, care and treatment under the
SVPA not necessarily be conditioned exclusively upon a finding of compulsive behavior.” In re W.Z., 773 A.2d at 105.
284. In re W.Z., 773 A.2d at 105.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 106. The court concluded that “plainly” the Court had not intended to limit the application of the statute to only those with a volitional impairment because the language of the statute itself defined mental incapacity to
include either volitional or emotional capacity. Id.
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287

dicted to be sexually dangerous in the future. The court did not
believe the Supreme Court had implied that an offender with an
emotional disorder that makes him likely to commit future sex acts
288
is not subject to commitment. The court concluded that the Supreme Court specifically held that Due Process is not violated when
the definition of mental abnormality includes either emotional or
289
volitional impairment.
Further, the court opined that Hendricks requires that an offender subject to detainment be unable to control his dangerousness; however, lack of volitional control is not the only possible
290
cause of future dangerous sexual behavior. The court argued
that a person with a volitional disorder might suffer from a sexual
compulsion that limits his ability to control his behavior. A person
with an emotional disorder might experience anger or cruelty
when he cannot control his actions. A person with a cognitive impairment might suffer from hallucinations or delusions and not be
able to control his behavior. Any, or all, of these disorders might
291
lead to sexual offending. The court reasoned that although the
SVPA includes impaired cognitive ability as a condition, which may
be a causative factor in a person’s predisposition to sexual violence,
that factor does not alter the scope of the statute in which the legislature has discretion in defining mental abnormality to include
292
emotional capacity.
The result of the legislature’s identification of both emotional
and volitional capacity in the definition of mental abnormality was
to include not only an inability to control behavior, but also “nega293
tive behavior.” The court reasoned that “neither volitional capacity nor emotional capacity has any talismanic significance but
rather lies within the discretion afforded a state legislature to de287. Id. at 107.
288. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997)).
289. Id. The court also concluded that the Supreme Court would uphold a
state SVP statute if it relies on conditions of detainment upon the State proving
the defendant’s mental abnormality that results in “an inability to control sexually
dangerous behavior.” Id.
290. Id. Under the SVPA, a person may be deemed to have a mental abnormality that results in his inability to control his dangerousness in one of three different ways: an emotional impairment, a cognitive impairment, or a volitional impairment. Id. (citing N. J. STAT. § 30:4-27.26 (2002)).
291. Id. Like the Kansas Act, the SVPA defines mental abnormality as a condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity in a manner that predisposes him to sexual violence. Id
292. Id.
293. Id. at 108-09.
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294

fine mental health terms.” W.Z. argued that “failure to limit commitments to only those who suffer from a lack of volition would
295
require the statute to be voided for over-breadth.” The court
concluded that the SVPA is not overbroad because it is applicable
only to sex offenders who have been convicted and have suffered
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which increases
296
their risk of re-offending in the future.
297
Next, in In re Leon G., Leon pled guilty to five counts of child
molestation and one count of sexual abuse and was sentenced to a
298
twelve-year prison term in the State of Arizona.
Leon was
screened to determine his sex offender status (sexual violent
predator). The evaluating psychologist, Dr. Barry Morenz, believed
that Leon suffered from a sexual deviance that predisposed him to
299
commit future sexually violent acts.
The Arizona Act defines
“mental disorder” as a “paraphilia, personality disorder, or conduct
disorder or any combination [thereof] . . . that predisposes a person to commit sexual acts,” rendering the individual sexually dan300
gerous. Dr. Morenz did not testify that Leon suffered a volitional
294. Id. at 109 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359).
295. Id. at 110.
296. Id. The statute’s inclusion of emotional and cognitive deficits in the definition of mental abnormality does not indicate that the statute is vague or overbroad. Id. The court determined that if a person is “likely to engage in acts of
sexual violence,” the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence, that the
defendant shows a “propensity, inclination or tendency, to commit acts of sexual
violence and must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, the degree of such
a propensity.” Id. The court recognized difficulties regarding the establishment
of a standard for detainment based on dangerousness because dangerousness is
hard to define, and is often vague in nature and stated that courts will need to
evaluate both the likelihood of conduct and the magnitude of W.Z.’s harm in order to determine whether commitment is appropriate. Id. at 111. W.Z. also argued that the SVPA is impermissibly vague and ambiguous and argued that the
terms “likely,” “propensity,” and “threat” are undefined, but the court rejected
that argument. Id. at 113.
297. 18 P.3d 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
298. Id. at 171.
299. Id. The jury found that Leon was a sexually violent predator. Id. Dr.
Morenz testified that Leon might commit future sexual acts in part based on a
prior sex offense. Id. at 172. Leon argued that his initial screening was defective
because he did not have counsel present, the State improperly presented evidence
of a prior sex offense, and the detainment under the civil commitment law invalidated his 1982 plea agreement because the possibility of civil commitment did not
exist at the time he entered his plea (Ex Post Facto argument). Id. The court
overruled all of these arguments. Id. at 172-73.
300. Id. at 174 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3701(5) (Supp. 2000)). The Arizona Act associates a present mental disorder with future sexual dangerousness
and nothing more is required to commit someone. The issue of volitional control
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impairment, but rather that he had a “cognitive distortion” and
had some “cognitive illusions” about his behavior, but that he was
301
able to control his behavior.
The court attempted to “read into” the Act the missing component of volition; however, there was concern about changing the
law’s objective since that would violate the separation of powers
302
principle and intrude upon the legislature’s specified role. After
a thorough review, the court could not find any language in the Act
suggesting a volitional impairment requirement and, consequently,
held that because this requirement was lacking and had essentially
303
been mandated by Hendricks, the law was unconstitutional. In
304
Glick v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Arizona
for reconsideration in light of Crane. As of the date of the submission of this article for publication, the Arizona Supreme Court had
not yet issued a new opinion on this matter.
IX. DEBATE BETWEEN COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
In his article Fear of Danger, Flight From Culpability, Stephen J.
Morse argued against the increasing social and constitutional acceptance of pure preventive detainment of sexually dangerous in305
dividuals. He argued that after Hendricks, any convicted criminal
may be found mentally abnormal and civilly committed after re306
lease from prison. The traditional distinction between criminal
and civil confinement, based on both responsibility and nonresponsibility, protects the civil rights and freedom of individuals.
However, cases like Hendricks, decided with public safety in mind,
307
have clouded the distinction. Morse reasons that the Court went
too far to protect the public, violating individual rights of liberty
and justice and suggesting that societal safety is not worth the poor impairment is neither mentioned nor implied. The Act did not impose the requirement of a loss of control.
301. Id. at 175 n.4.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. In re Leon G., 18 P.3d 169, vacated by sub nom. Glick v. Arizona, 535 U.S.
982 (2002).
305. See Morse, supra note 27, at 250. Stephen J. Morse is a law professor at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. For a full discussion and argument about
volitional problems, see Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1587 (1994).
306. Morse, supra note 27, at 250.
307. Id.
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308

tential costs of civil rights.
In addition, Morse argued that Leroy Hendricks was fully responsible for his crimes, even though his behavior indicated a men309
tal disorder. Moreover, he contended that Hendricks was thinking clearly and knew the difference between moral right and
310
wrong. Morse argued that when Hendricks had completed the
sentence for his latest offense he still presented a risk to re-offend,
yet he did not qualify for traditional civil detainment for mentally
311
ill people. He cited Foucha, in which the Supreme Court held
that the continued involuntary detainment of an insanity acquittee
no longer suffering from a mental disorder violates his individual
rights, even if the defendant cannot prove that he does not present
312
a future risk of harm to himself or others.
Morse argued that the Kansas Act tried to fit Hendricks into a
gap between civil and criminal law, because he did not specifically
313
fall into either arena. However, Kansas attempted to bring the
statute within the civil commitment, non-punitive arena, explaining
that sexual violent predators were not responsible for their danger314
ous acts.
Kansas’ use of mental abnormality criteria created a
315
non-responsibility justification problem. As such, Morse argued
that the statute was confusing because under the statute, a sexually
violent predator may be culpable enough to deserve the stigma and
punishment of criminal punishment, yet not responsible enough to
be granted the liberty from involuntary civil confinement that even
very predictable, high risk, and dangerous but responsible indi316
viduals retain.
He contended that “[o]ur society must decide
whether sexually violent predators are mad or bad and respond ac308. Id. at 251.
309. Id. at 258.
310. Id.
311. Id. Morse believed that not all mental disorders negate responsibility and
though Hendricks had a major mental illness, he lacked psychotic features, could
think clearly, and could make decisions about his treatment. Id.
312. Id. at 256 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (stating that the
State cannot civilly commit responsible defendants due to dangerousness alone,
even if a defendant is still suffering from an antisocial personality disorder and has
a dangerous or violent background)).
313. Id. at 258. Many argue that individuals, like Hendricks, know exactly what
they are doing and lack some control problems, yet should be held accountable
and responsible unlike traditional civilly committed individuals such as insanity
acquittees. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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317

cordingly.”
As a result of Hendricks, Morse claimed that society has gained
public safety but the civil rights of innocent and responsible indi318
viduals are threatened.
He opined that the Hendricks decision
commingles and confuses culpability and non-responsibility as prerequisites for detainment and threatens pure preventive deten319
tion. He maintained that the Kansas Act’s definition of a mental
abnormality was vague and incomplete regarding its association
320
with future sexual dangerousness. Morse stated that the statute’s
definition of a mental abnormality—“congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional and volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such a person a menace to the health and safety of
others”—is nothing more than a way to describe behavior and its
321
etiology.
Morse debated whether there was any good reason to believe
that sexually violent predators specifically are unable to control
322
their behaviors in contrast to other offenders.
He also questioned why sexual desires are more compelling, intense, and seri323
ous than other similarly strong desires. Volitional problems are
324
not well understood. A personality disorder is a diagnostic category, and individuals who suffer from these disorders usually are
325
not psychotic and are responsible for their actions.
All behavior
stems from genetic or acquired factors that affect character or voli326
tional predispositions. The potency of some sex offenders’ sexual drives makes it difficult for them to assess the likelihood of being caught, yet this does not differentiate these offenders from
other types of impulsive criminals and “impulsivity does not warrant
327
an irrationality excuse.”
317. Id. at 259 (stating that if a defendant is morally responsible, he should not
be civilly detained).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 260.
321. Id. Morse stated, “[n]othing else in the definition differentiates the sexual predator from any other person.” Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 262 (Morse compared the deviant desires of sex offenders to the
desires of greed of property offenders).
324. Id.
325. Id. (stating that mental abnormality is not a recognized diagnostic category, rather it is a legal term).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 262.
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In addition, there is a question of whether the volitional impairment of a repeat, assaultive, violent offender, who may have an
antisocial personality disorder or severe impulse control disorder,
should be civilly committed to protect the public. These offenders
could be classified similarly to pedophiles who are volitionally impaired, rather than cognitively impaired individuals such as traditional insanity acquittees. Could other volitionally impaired criminals be treated like violent sexual predators? As in Crane, are there
some sex offenders who are not volitionally impaired, having some
ability to control their offending behaviors and being less dangerous, while other sex offenders are more volitionally impaired and at
higher risk to sexually offend? Are volitionally impaired offenders
with pedophilia higher risk sex offenders than antisocial rapists
who can control their offending behaviors, but simply choose not
to?
Further, Morse opined that sex offenders pay for their crimes
328
in prison and once released should not be civilly detained. Although some high-risk offenders will be released, this is a consequence of the justice system under a notion of liberty and courts
329
should initially give longer sentences to sex offenders. The holding in Hendricks presents a danger that not only violates traditional
liberty rights, but also threatens all defendants to face civil com330
mitment.
Morse also questioned whether the Court’s definition of mental abnormality empowers the State to confine culpable defendants
331
to indefinite, preventive detainment in order to protect society.
According to Hendricks, a state legislature may define mental abnormality as it sees fit, including finding that such mentally abnor332
mal people are unable to control their actions. One of the problems in Hendricks is the Court’s interpretation of the definition of
mental abnormality. It cannot be logically limited to sexually violent predators; rather, the definition is too vague and broad and
333
can be applied to any criminal act.

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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X. RECOMMENDATIONS
States should have the autonomy to initiate legislation regarding the civil commitment of violent sexual predators. The substantive Due Process argument prevents the government from violating
334
individual rights, especially freedom and liberty rights. When discussing the legitimacy of various forms of civil commitment, two
335
structural components of American government arise. The first
component is federalism, when the United States Supreme Court
336
interprets laws by the states. Federalism is based on the Constitution and separation of powers between the states and the federal
337
government. There is often conflict and confusion regarding the
338
relationship between the states and the federal government. The
second structural issue is the separation of powers reflecting governmental powers divided not only between the national government and the states, but also among the three branches of govern339
ment.
Initially, the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was a state
legislative issue, but when it was reviewed by the Supreme Court,
340
federalism was at issue. One fundamental issue in Hendricks was
what governmental entity should decide the appropriate grounds
341
for involuntary civil detainment of sex offenders. Is the United
States Supreme Court in a better or more qualified position than a
state legislature to determine whether a civil commitment law is
342
appropriate in these states? State legislatures have the advantage
of gaining information from lobbyist groups and constituents who
343
provide them with facts and figures reflecting their concerns.
State legislatures reflect the attitudes of their constituents, whereas
344
the courts lack this information.
When discussing federalism, there appears to be a more active
role by the states, their representatives, democratic institutions, and

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

See McAllister, supra note 59, at 269.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
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345

law making bodies than the court systems. However, this power
among the states does not give them uncontrollable discretion
346
when implementing laws such as these.
Many argue that the
states should be prevented from labeling specific groups of indi347
viduals as mentally ill and detaining them indefinitely.
When
considering civil commitment laws, state legislation should take
into consideration sound medical and scientific research but bear
348
in mind societal values, attitudes, and norms.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme
Court in Hendricks respected judicial veneration to the states’ legislative objectives regarding civil commitment of sex offenders and
349
the definitions of mental disorders and sex offender treatment.
In contrast, most courts will give respect to state legislative projects
rather than judicially intervening, especially when these statutes involve mental health professionals, assessment and treatment of the
350
mentally ill, and dangerousness.
The issues of mental health, mental abnormality, dangerousness, and civil commitment are not clear-cut and the states should
have the right to choose legislative procedures as long as they are
in line with the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court’s role is to interpret laws and determine if certain laws
adhere to the Constitution. Once the United States Supreme
Court makes such a decision to determine the constitutionality of
certain legal issues, the states should have the power to determine
what laws they wish to initiate or enact.
States, with respect to the principles of federalism, should have
the autonomy to initiate involuntary civil commitment legislation
for sexually violent predators. Simply put, citizens elect state legislators and the citizens’ attitudes affect the decisions of the legisla351
ture.
Through democratic principles, the citizens should have
345. Id. at 271-72. See also Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal
Responsibility: The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment After Kansas v.
Hendricks, 25 AM. J. L. & MED . 117 (1999). In his note, Adam Falk stated his belief that the Hendricks decision does not limit the scope of a state’s power to indefinitely detain offenders. A state could link driving under the influence or under-age drinking to alcohol-use disorders or, similarly, drug crimes to cocaine
dependency disorders. Id. at 120. A state could conceivably civilly commit all persons convicted of all drug or alcohol related crimes. Id.
346. McAllister, supra note 59, at 272.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 291.
350. See id.
351. See id. at 271.
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the right to vote for or against laws that involve civil commitment of
sexually violent persons. The states that do initiate such legislation
should keep in mind that the imposition of harsher sentencing
guidelines, such as substitution of consecutive criminal sentencing
guidelines rather than concurrent sentencing guidelines, may
eliminate the civil commitment debate.
Also, the development of comprehensive sex offender treatment programs and further research regarding future sex offending recidivism after treatment to measure the efficacy of treatment
is suggested. Providing comprehensive sex offender treatment for
defendants in prison, prior to release into the community, may
conserve state resources, protect defendants’ civil liberties, and
possibly negate debates surrounding civil commitment while protecting society from the risk of future harm.
XI. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has taken a
strong stance in protecting community safety by attempting to prevent future sexually violent offenses. This has consistently raised
the question of whether this effort has been done while sacrificing
individuals’ civil liberties. In Hendricks, the Court stated that a
sexually violent predator statute did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment,
the United States Constitution’s prohibition against Ex Post Facto
352
laws, or a defendant’s substantive Due Process rights. The Court
also addressed the issues of future dangerousness, mental abnor353
mality, and mental illness.
The Court declined to adopt a specific definition of the concept of mental illness or mental abnormality and held that the Kansas Act’s mental abnormality provision did not require proof of
354
mental illness enough to justify civil detainment. The majority
and dissenting opinions acknowledged that the issue of how to decide what level of mental illness is required to qualify for civil
355
commitment is challenging if not impossible.
Both opinions
point out that there is no consensus among mental health professionals on this important question of mental illness or mental ab-

352.
353.
354.
355.

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
Id.
See McAllister, supra note 59, at 269.
See id.
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356

normality.
The Court agreed with the trial and appeals courts in Kansas v.
357
Hendricks in that pedophilia appears to qualify as a mental
358
abnormality under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.
The Court posited that Hendricks’ mental health issues fit under
the mental abnormality clause within the Kansas Sexually Violent
359
Predator Act. This decision provides a broad-based definition of
mental abnormality and volitional impairment. In addition, it is
different from traditional civil commitment mental abnormality
definitions such as insanity, involving primarily cognitive impairments.
The Court recently upheld a civil commitment scheme similar
to that in Hendricks when it held in Seling v. Young that the Washington Act was civil in nature, and did not violate the defendant’s
360
Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto claims.
The Act was determined to be civil in nature and not punitive as long as it provides
sexually violent predators with adequate care, and individualized
361
treatment in a civil and non-prison institutional setting.
The
Court opined that the Act must consider the Due Process requirements that the conditions and duration of confinement bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the sex offenders are
civilly detained.
Traditionally, mental abnormality and mental health issues in
civil commitment proceedings have involved psychotic disorders,
primarily schizophrenia, which classify an individual dangerous due
to his mental condition. In essence, civil commitment statutes have
incorporated dangerousness and mentally ill criteria as well as nonresponsibility issues. Historically, an individual could not be sent to
356. See id.
357. State v. Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
358. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355-56, 360.
359. Id.
360. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001).
361. Id. at 265 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080(2) (1992 and Supp.
2000)). According to the Act, when the defendant is found to be civilly committed
as a sex offender, he should be committed for control, treatment, and care in the
custody of the department of social and health services. Once committed and detained, he has the right to treatment. He is entitled to an annual examination of
his mental condition and if that evaluation indicates that his condition is changed
to the degree that he is not likely to sexually re-offend, then state officials must
authorize a petition to the court for conditional release. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not safe, is sexually dangerous and will likely
commit future sex offenses. The defendant may also seek to petition the court for
release. Id. at 253-56.
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prison in a punitive fashion if he did not appreciate the wrongfulness (cognitive prong) of the crime at the time of the act, or in
some jurisdictions, was unable to conform his acts to the law or refrain from acting (volitional prong) due to his mental illness. In
either case, the offender would have been found not legally responsible for his offense. Conventionally, the defendant then
would have been confined to a secure but less punitive treatment
362
setting. A defendant could also be sent to a mental hospital if he
362. In the United States, there are different standards for the Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity Defense. The insanity standards commonly used in the United
States are as follows: The M’Naghten standard provides that for an individual to be
found NGRI, he/she must be “laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or
if he knew it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” Another standard, the M’Naghten irresistible impulse standard, indicates that in addition to the
M’Naghten rule, a defendant is not responsible for his criminal offenses when:
1) if, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost
the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing
the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed; 2)
and if at the time, the alleged crime was so connected with much mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have caused the
product of it solely.
To prove an irresistible impulse defense, the issue of volitional-behavioral impairment is crucial. The loss of power to choose must be the result of a mental illness
rather than a strong emotional response in order to satisfy the irresistible impulse
standard. A rage-induced emotional outburst would not satisfy this test. The
“power to choose” must be assessed by whether the defendant has a desire to resist
the emotional act and whether he has the capacity to resist it. This loss of power
to choose “must reflect some internal imperative to carry out behavior that is
forbidden both on a societal and a personal basis.” This internal impairment may
be due to a compulsion such as repetitive behaviors he is unable to resist. The
“loss of power” to not commit the criminal act involves the inability to control the
behavior, which can be communicated through the irresistible impulse standard:
“acts beyond his control,” being “overwhelmed,” and “unable to control his actions
and impulses.” Another standard, the Durham standard, commonly referred to as
the “product rule,” states that, “an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was a product of a mental disease or defect.” A defect is a mental
condition that most likely will not be improved and is due to a mental and or
physical disease. Another standard, the American Law Institute (ALI) standard,
states that a defendant is not responsible for his criminal acts if “as a result of a
mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” The phrase “conformity of conduct” represents the volitional/behavioral prong of the ALI standard. The term replaced the earlier irresistible impulse and refers to any significant deficit “in self-determined purposive
behavior at the time of the offense. Conformity of conduct addresses the defendant’s ability to choose and to withhold important behavior preceding and including the crime in question.” An individual often loses both cognitive and volitional
control. It should be noted, the author gives an example that ritualistic behavior
may or may not be symptomatic of mental illness and should be carefully evalu-
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were assessed to be not competent to stand trial and would be
treated. An attempt would be made to restore the person’s competency to stand trial. The defendant can only be civilly committed
for a reasonable length of time to assess their competency. In
many states, defendants are committed for competency related issues for a certain amount of time based on the severity of the felony or misdemeanor. In cases in which the defendant is found to
be not guilty by reason of insanity or not competent to stand trial,
there is usually no question of severe mental illness.
Among the questions in Hendricks were whether the defendant
suffered from a mental illness, what kind, and the severity of mental illness. It was established that Hendricks was sane and could
appreciate right from wrong, but appeared to lack volitional control. The Court reasoned that his sexual behavior was caused by a
volitional impairment causing an inability to control his acts and
363
qualified this as a mental abnormality. As previously noted, some
states have included a volitional component in their civil commitment statutes for the criminally insane. The Court reasoned that if
he was volitionally impaired, mentally ill based on a diagnosis of
pedophilia, and was dangerous based on criminal history and prior
sex offense convictions and admittance to uncontrollable urges, he
364
could be civilly committed.
ated for its relevance to volitional abilities. For example, “some defendants with
sexual paraphilias may intentionally use ritualistic behavior to heighten their sexual pleasure; these behaviors (dependent, of course, on the impairment) are
unlikely to represent uncontrollable behavior.” The Insanity Defense Reform Act
(IRDA) was passed in 1984, after John Hinckley pled not guilty by reason of insanity for attempted murder of former President Reagan, which caused a public outcry and led to legislative reform. Procedurally,
the act places the burden on the defendant to prove, by clear and convincing evidence that he/she meets the substantive elements of the
test. The test includes that at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant, as the result of severe mental disease or defect,
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of
his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, CONDUCTING INSANITY EVALUATIONS (2d ed.
2000) 14, 71, 73-75, 79-81.
363. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
364. Id. Both pedophilia and, the less common, sexual sadism are paraphilias.
Paraphilias are a general classification for recurrent, intense sexual urges, fantasies, or behaviors that involve unusual objects, activities, or situations that cause
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. An affinity to commit rape could be classified as a
paraphilia not otherwise specified (not fitting into a specific paraphilia category).
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL DISORDERS, 493 (4th ed. 1994)
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More recent court cases, such as Crane, Linehan, and Commitment of W.Z., have addressed the complex issue of avolitional versus
volitional impairments. In Crane, the Court held that the Kansas
Act was satisfied by emotional or personality disorders leading to
sexually violent behavior and did not require a component of the
lack of volitional control. This is a crucial holding because it opens
the door to complicated analyses based on a wide range and scope
of personality disorders, including primarily antisocial personality
disorder and the clinical construct of psychopathy.
Civil commitment statutes for sex offenders usually require
that the person have a mental illness or disability that causes them
to be more likely to engage in future sexually violent acts and that
treatment is necessary to reduce their risk to sexually re-offend.
These statutes may be applied to a wide array of sex offenders. For
example, some sex offenders are pedophiles who suffer from a volitional impairment, similar to irresistible impulse in insanity acquittees. In essence, they may lack the ability to exercise making
choices, and this inability leaves them unable to control their behavior. Some may argue that a defendant suffering from Bipolar
Disorder, suffering from mania and high energy and possible psychotic features, may be more likely to act out aggressively and
commit an assault while still understanding right from wrong. The
explanation for this behavior is that this high energy is triggered by
a chemical imbalance and may be accompanied by psychotic features such as delusions, but the defendant might still be aware of
right and wrong. In some states, such an offender could be found
insane and civilly committed based on an inability to control his
conduct.
Similarly, some professionals argue that pedophiles should be
civilly committed. A pedophile could have a sexually deviant
arousal system, a possible biochemical disorder. Although the person understands that it is wrong to sexually assault a young boy,
that person may lack the ability to conform his behavior to the
rules of law. Why could he not be deemed insane in line with some
states’ insanity statutes that include irresistible impulses or failure
to conform behavior to the requirements of the law?
Contrarily, other types of sex offenders may suffer from an
avolitional impairment, such as antisocial personality disorder or
365
psychopathy.
These offender types have an ability to make
(DSM-IV).
365. Psychopathy is the disorder of a criminal personality that combines affec-
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choices, but consciously choose to act in antisocial ways and violate
the laws and rights of other people. An example of this type of offender is a male who has a prior juvenile and adult criminal record,
and commits a violent rape during a burglary of a house, indicating
more of an opportunistic crime. Unless he has a pattern of this
type of behavior and qualifies as a serial rapist, this individual presents as a much different type of sex offender than the average pedophile. It is conceded that both types of offenders are viewed as
dangers to society. This comparison begs the question: which offender poses a higher risk for sex offending in the future and
should they be treated differently?
Some research in the field of sex offending indicates that the
two factors most highly correlated with sex offending are psychopa366
thy and sexual deviancy (paraphilias). For example, sexual sadist
psychopaths are perhaps the most dangerous sex offender, as they
typically have a combination of both volitional and avolitional impairments due to their sexual deviancy and psychopathic traits.
Psychopathic pedophiles are equally as dangerous as both groups
usually display a pattern of violent sexual assaults with numerous
victims. Should these types of offender have a longer commitment
status than an individual who only has either an avolitional or a volitional impairment? Those types of psychopathic offenders are often times not amenable to treatment. Who should have the longer
term of commitment, the individual with a volitional impairment
367
or the individual with the avolitional impairment?
tive or emotional components such a lack of conscience, guilt, remorse, and a
criminal behavioral lifestyle. Most psychopaths who are incarcerated have antisocial personality disorder; not all antisocial personality individuals are psychopaths.
There is a general belief that psychopaths comprise a small amount of the criminal
population who commit a substantial proportion of serious and violent offenses.
366. See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A MetaAnalysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.,
348, 348-62 (1998).
367. Dennis Doren, clinical/forensic psychologist and a national expert on
sexual offending, particularly on risk assessments and actuarial risk prediction, is
one of many clinicians faced with the task of applying the United States Supreme
Court holdings in sex offender civil commitment evaluations. After the holding in
Crane, he and others have had to apply the Court’s analysis and adjust reports and
consider volitional personality disorder issues as causal factors of sex offending.
He prepared an addendum to a previous report which he shared with this author
and addressed antisocial personality disorder diagnosis and psychopathy. He cited
this language in the opinion:
and this proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior, when
viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must
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A. Sex Offender Research: Recidivism and Treatment
The issues of amenability and success in treatment as applied
to sex offender recidivism studies are key in deciding if and when
sex offenders should be released from civil commitment facilities.
The question of who is likely to re-offend and what factors are tied
to that recidivism are important, as they identify what type of offenders are more likely to re-offend and what demographic factors
are associated with offending.
The current research on recidivism of sex offenders is growing, but it remains perplexing and uncertain. Most studies use reconviction rates since many sex offenses are actually unreported. It
is difficult at times to obtain a formal conviction, and therefore,
there are more actual offenses than arrests and more arrests than
convictions. Re-conviction rates appear to offer the most solid
proof that a sex offense was actually committed. This data may be
more readily available, but may not be as accurate as base rates for
re-offending. Therefore, there are countless sex offenses that occur, and while many offenses become arrests, the majority of those
be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary case.
Id. Doren believes that the nature of the diagnosed disorder and its severity are
relevant to the finding of whether or not this condition distinguishes the individual from the “dangerous but typical recidivist.” In the specific case, Doren believes
that the respondent’s antisocial personality disorder predisposed him to commit
sexually violent acts, although most individuals with this diagnosis do not commit
sex crimes. He believes that the nature of the individual’s criminal personality is
distinguished from the “dangerous but typical recidivist.” However, the severity of
the characterological deficit is uncertain. Doren found that the respondent was
no more psychopathic than the average prison inmate, but more psychopathic
than the average sex offender. Doren found the respondent to have certain personality traits that were indicative of underlying recidivism risk representing a significant severity of the disorder beyond the “dangerous but typical recidivist.” He
concluded that the respondent’s antisocial personality disorder entails a condition
that causes him to have “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Does that
mean that antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy indicate a volitional
impairment? That is a key question in light of the Crane decision. Doren and
other evaluators are forced with the task of analyzing and dissecting diagnoses
such as antisocial personality disorder, an accepted diagnosis in the field dealing
with features of a criminal personality and often viewed as an avolitional/emotional/personality diagnosis as the individual can choose to or not to
engage in antisocial behaviors. This diagnosis is different than a diagnosis of pedophilia, a disorder that requires an impulse control/volitional issue. It is difficult
to dissect such a diagnosis that has volitional and avolitional factors and relate
them to the etiology of the sex crime(s).
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sex offenses do not later become convictions.
Along these lines, the issue of base rates, the true number of
offenses committed by a given group of offenders, is the number
with which to be concerned. It is impossible to know true base
rates due to the fact that some offenses are never reported and/or
charges are dropped due to poor investigation techniques, lack of
cooperation by victims or witnesses, or violation of the individual’s
constitutional rights in some aspect.
There are several sex offender recidivism studies that address
the likelihood that sex offenders will re-offend. These studies assist
mental health professionals and decision makers in the development of risk prediction instruments that incorporate the factors
most highly correlated with sexual recidivism. A 1997 study by
Robert Prentky et al. provides a comprehensive study on sex of368
fender recidivism. The authors examined recidivism rates for sex
offenders focusing on child molesters and rapists. The authors
found that in evaluating rapists, thirty-nine percent of them had a
failure rate (re-charged) after twenty-five years, while twenty-four
369
percent were actually re-convicted at a later date. The study also
determined that failure rates for child molesters was fifty-two per370
cent.
A 1998 study by Dennis Doren, concentrated on the impor371
tance of recidivism base rates as opposed to re-conviction rates.
Doren stated that one needs a reasonable estimation of the base
rate of violence within a certain population to provide a reliable
and effective prediction of future dangerousness under civil com372
mitment laws. Since most studies regarding sexual recidivism use
368. Robert A. Prentky et al. Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists:
A Methodological Analysis. 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 635 (1997). The authors operationalized recidivism as a failure rate and calculated as the proportion of offenders
who re-offended using survival analysis. The authors classified charges as opposed
to a conviction as a re-offense. Id. at 641.
369. Id. at 643.
370. Id.
371. Dennis Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender Recidivism,
and the “Sexual Predator” Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 97, 97-114 (1998).
See also DENNIS DOREN, EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL FOR CIVIL
COMMITMENTS AND BEYOND, Vol. 3, (2002) (describing different states’ civil commitment procedures, describes research concerning recidivism, discusses the clinical versus actuarial debate, clinical/diagnostic issues, admissibility issues, and provides information on report writing for court).
372. Base rates are described as being the “true prevalence of the defined behavior within the defined population.” Id. at 98 (citing Randy Borum, Improving
the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 945, 945-56 (1996)).
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reconviction rates as failures, those rates tend to seriously underes373
timate the true frequency in which sex offenses occur. Doren asserts that current sex offender recidivism research underestimates
the true base rates because the studies do not last long enough and
do not track the offenders over a lengthy period of time, as some
offenders commit crimes over twenty years after release from incar374
ceration.
Logic tells us that many sex offenders do not get caught for
their crimes, but researchers must use only reported acts of sex of375
fending behavior to qualify as offenses.
Doren cited the 1997
Prentky et al. study, as the most appropriate report on recidivism.376
The 1997 study indicated a fifty-two percent failure rate for extrafamilial child molesters over a twenty-five-year period and reasoned
that this figure might still be underestimating the true base rate for
that population because not every new offender was caught and le377
gally charged for at least one new sexual crime. Doren believes
that the fifty-two percent recidivism figure is a conservative ap378
proximation of the true base rate for recidivism. Doren also referred to Hanson et al., which reported a sex offender recidivism
379
rates for child molesters of about thirty-five percent. Doren cited
Hanson and Bussiere’s 1996 meta-analysis involving over sixty-one
studies and close to ten thousand offenders and found that almost
thirteen percent of child molesters sexually re-offended in an aver380
age period of four to five years after their release from prison.
The Hanson and Bussiere meta-analysis reported that close to nineteen percent of rapists sexually re-offended after four to five years
373. Id. at 99.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 101.
378. See id. at 101. Doren offered an example of a defendant who was never
caught and legally charged for a new offense, but was inaccurately labeled as a
non-re-offender. Importantly, some small group of offenders are charged with sex
crimes and may be innocent of them and other sex offense charges, this group
would likely be smaller than the number of re-offenders who are never caught and
charged. Id.
379. Id. at 102. See R. Karl Hanson et al., A Comparison of Child Molesters and
Nonsexual Criminals: Risk Predictors and Long-Term Recidivism, 32 J. RES . IN CRIME &
DELINQ., 325, 325-37 (1995). Hanson used re-conviction rates as recidivism in his
study. Hanson also included incest offenders who are known to have lower sexual
recidivism rates. Id.
380. Doren, supra note 371, at 104. See Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 366.
This rate was similar to other studies after four to five years after incarceration release.
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381

after release.
Additionally, Doren warned against the tendency to falsely
predict non-recidivism and falsely predict recidivism. He believed
that there is a significant “under prediction” of sexual offending in
relation to the civil commitment of sex offenders and the evalua382
tions for these civil commitment hearings. Finally, in the study,
Doren supported research that incorporates longer study periods
offering more time to re-offend as well as broadening the definition of re-offense to recharge for example rather than reconviction,
which would approximate the true base rate of sex offending, offer383
ing a more reliable estimate of sexual violence risk prediction.
In addition, an important study by Hanson and Bussiere in
1998 offers the most extensive meta-analysis of sex offending stud384
ies. They found that demographic variables, including young age
and single marital status, were related to sexual offense recidi385
vism. Criminal lifestyle variables were modest predictors and antisocial personality disorder and total number of prior offenses had
386
stronger correlations with future sex offending. The risk for future sex offenses was greater for offenders who had a prior sex offense, had victimized strangers, had extrafamilial victims, began sex
offending at a young age, had male victims, and engaged in a wide
387
variety of sexual acts during the offense. The strongest predictors
of sexual recidivism were sexual deviancy and sexual interest in
children measured by phallometric assessment, which by itself was
the single most highly correlated factor indicative of future sex of388
fending. Failure to complete treatment and a negative relationship with one’s mother were also significant factors; however, being
a victim of sexual abuse as a child was not significantly related, con389
trary to popular belief. The study concluded that rapists were
more likely to engage in nonsexual violence than were child moles390
ters.
381. Doren, supra note 371, at 106.
382. Id. at 110.
383. Id.
384. Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 366.
385. Id. at 351.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. Phallometric assessments of sexual interest in rape were not significantly related to recidivism. Id. at 351, 353.
389. Id. at 353.
390. Id. The authors found that nonsexual violent recidivism and general
criminal recidivism were best predicted by criminal history. Id. at 354.
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Previously, a 1990 study by Rice et al. examined the follow-up
of rapists after release from incarceration to assess general, violent,
391
and sexual recidivism. They found that the best statistical predictors of sex offending were sexual aggression, sexual deviance, and
392
general criminal behavior. The authors found that sexual and
violent recidivism were predicted by phallometrically measured
393
sexual interest (sexual deviancy) and degree of psychopathy.
Similarly, an article by Quinsey et al. addressed the likelihood of
sex offending recidivism in rapists and child molesters by implementing a prediction scale, an actuarial risk prediction instrument,
and found that sexual recidivism was predicted by: previous criminal history, psychopathy ratings, and phallometric assessment
394
data. These studies have revealed profound results as a specific
population of sex offenders, those who experience sexual deviancy
and severe antisocial personality (psychopathy), are at a signifi395
cantly high risk to sexually re-offend.
In addition, other studies have provided further insight into
recidivism. For example, Serin et al. examined psychopathy, deviant sexual arousal, and sexual recidivism and found that there is a
significant relationship existing between sexual deviance and psychopathy, most notably for extrafamilial child molesters than rap396
ists and incest offenders.
A study by Rice et al. examined the
397
recidivism of child molesters. Factors found to be correlated with
sexual recidivism included single marital status, previous admissions to correctional facilities, previous convictions for property
crimes, male victims, previous sexual offense convictions, diagnosis
of a personality disorder, and significant phallometric scores re398
garding inappropriate sexual age preferences.
A study by Hanson et al. compared recidivism rates between
399
child molesters and nonsexual criminals. In that study, the au391. Marnie E. Rice et al., A Follow-Up of Rapists Assessed in a Maximum-Security
Psychiatric Facility, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 435 (1990).
392. Id. at 446.
393. Id.
394. Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidivism, 10 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1 (1995).
395. For a review of psychopathy, see James F. Hemphill et al., Psychopathy and
Recidivism: A Review, LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1998).
396. R. C. Serin et al., Psychopathy and Deviant Sexual Arousal in Incarcerated Offenders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 8 (1994).
397. Marie E. Rice et al., Sexual Recidivism Among Child Molesters Released From a
Maximum Security Prison, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 381 (1991).
398. Id. at 383.
399. R. Karl Hanson et al., A Comparison of Child Molesters and Nonsexual Crimi-
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thors found differences between child molesters and nonsexual offenders regarding recidivism, as the child molesters tended to be
older, more often married, less educated, and had less extensive
criminal records for nonsexual offenses than the nonsexual of400
fenders.
The child molesters in the sample comprised about
ninety-seven percent of the sexual offense recidivism in the sample,
while the nonsexual offenders were responsible for about ninety-six
401
percent of the nonsexual recidivism.
Ultimately, there is a growing amount of research regarding
recidivism and the issue of base rates, the true occurrence of offending, but small samples in studies limit the research. These
studies are providing ample data to develop actuarial risk prediction instruments, which are very useful when evaluating an offender’s risk.
A comprehensive study by Hall in 1995 involved a metaanalysis of sex offender treatment studies, and found that nineteen
percent of sex offenders who completed treatment in the studies
committed future sex offenses, while twenty-seven percent of sex
402
offenders who did not complete treatment sexually re-offended.
Some studies suggest that relapse prevention and cognitivenals: Risk Predictors and Long-Term Recidivism, 32 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ.
325 (1995).
400. Id. at 334.
401. Id. While both groups showed high rates for nonviolent offenses, the
nonsexual offenders had higher rates than the child molesters.
402. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A MetaAnalysis of Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 802, 806
(1995). The author found that both cognitive-behavioral and hormonal treatments appear more successful than strictly behavioral treatments. Id. at 807. A
criticism of the study could be that it overestimates the efficacy of treatment because it uses official reoffense data which may underestimate the true base rate of
sex offending. Id. at 808. For a comprehensive review of sexual offender risk assessment research and treatment efficacy, consult Robert A. Prentky & Ann W.
Burgess, Forensic Management of Sex Offenders (2000). The authors provide information on factors correlated with future risk such as gender of victim, strength of
preoccupation with children, prior sex offenses, substance abuse and social competence, antisocial behavior and psychopathy. While they warn that base rates for
sex offenders are unreliable, they discuss actuarial risk assessment instruments that
assist in predicting future sexual recidivism. In addition, the authors address
treatment modalities and efficacy issues as well as sex offender typologies into six
types of sex offenders including interpersonal offenders, narcissistic offenders, exploitative offenders, muted sadistic offenders, aggressive offenders, and overt sadistic offenders. Treatment programs for sex offenders often focus on relapse
prevention and cognitive behavioral type modalities focusing on development of
empathy, anger control problems, cognitive distortions and rationalizations, sexual fantasies and deviant sexual arousal, antisocial personality and criminal lifestyle variables. Id.
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behavioral modeled programs, along with strict supervision, monitoring, conditional release programs, polygraphs and phallometric
monitoring, are effective treatment strategies.
A comprehensive study by Margaret Alexander in 1999 involved a meta-analysis regarding the efficacy of sex offender treat403
ment.
This analysis examined relevant studies of sex offender
treatment between 1943 through 1996 involving child molesters
404
and rapists. The recidivism rate for treated juvenile sex offenders
was 7.1%, for treated rapists was 20.1%, for treated child molesters
was 14.4%, treated exhibitionists was 19.7%, for type-not-specified
was 13.1%, and the total treated offender group recidivism rate was
405
13%. The untreated recidivism data, including the untreated juvenile recidivism rate, was not applicable. The untreated rapist
group was 23.7%, the untreated child molester group 25.8%, the
untreated exhibitionistic group 57.1%, and the total untreated
406
group of sex offender recidivism rate was 18%.
The authors
found that the most successful treatment modality was the relapse
407
prevention model. Further, many treated sex offenders had reoffense rates below eleven percent, possibly suggesting that many
offenders do not need permanent institutionalization for treatment, and once treated, offenders may be monitored in the community which would be more cost-effective than inpatient treat408
ment.
These studies all support the fact that the issue of sex offender
treatment efficacy affects many states, especially those implementing civil commitment of sexual predator laws. Unfortunately, the
data is conflicted regarding whether the successful completion of
treatment in fact lowers risk of re-offending. If studies do not con403. Margaret Alexander, Sexual Offender Treatment Efficacy Revisited, 11 SEXUAL
ABUSE 109 (1999).
404. Id. at 103. The meta-analysis involved over 10,000 subjects. The subject
pool unfortunately did not include subjects who were terminated or dropped out.
Recidivism was defined as the number of offenders who were re-arrested for a new
sexual offense. Id. at 104. The author stated that re-arrest yields higher and more
accurate re-offense rates than re-conviction data. Id. at 111.
405. Id. at 105.
406. Id. at 105. Overall, the treated group as a whole re-offended at a thirteen
percent rate, whereas the untreated group re-offended at an eighteen percent
rate.
407. Id. at 106. They also found that outpatient treatment was similar in effectiveness to a hospital setting. Id. at 107. The authors found that treatment affected the recidivism rates of child molesters who had offended against males
more than any other sex offender type. Id. at 109.
408. Id. at 110.
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sistently indicate lower recidivism rates among the treated, then
these commitments will be in essence no more than warehouses of
the sexually dangerous, and these individuals will never be released.
B. The Role of the Forensic/Clinical Psychologist as Expert Witness in
Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent Predator Cases
Forensic psychological/psychiatric evaluations involving sexual
predator classifications for community notification and registration
conditions, parole sex offender evaluations, and evaluations for
civil commitment of violent sexual predators primarily involve two
analyses. First, a mental health professional must conduct a thorough clinical interview and gather clinical data about the defen409
dant. Second, the evaluator should use actuarial instruments and
compare the data on the offender, such as age and type of victim to
norms measuring the same data of sex offenders who have been released from incarceration, some being re-convicted of another sex
offense. The actuarial instruments provide a risk analysis, often a
percentage of likelihood of re-offending and a classification such as
low, moderate, or high risk.
In civil commitment evaluations, prison officials often warn
state officials of a high-risk sex offender to be released from prison,
and the offender will be evaluated upon probable cause. Also, an
evaluation along with a civil hearing with a jury will be conducted.
The evaluation will focus on the incorporation of actuarial instruments and clinical data, with the objective of clinically adjusting actuarial instruments. If the respondent is committed, he will be sent
to a civil commitment sex offender treatment facility, and he will be
eligible for annual reexaminations. These examinations focus on
treatment success as well as clinical information, since the actuarial
409. There is a tendency in civil commitment states, more so than in community notification states (Megan’s law), for defense attorneys to advise their clients
to refuse to submit to the formal sex offender evaluations, either before sentencing or while in prison, and the defendant has a right to do so based on a continuing right against self-incrimination in criminal cases. Therefore, quite often there
may be no clinical interview; this occurs in approximately forty percent of the
evaluations. This lack of information places limits on a solid clinical interview and
can affect the evaluator’s ability to assess certain personality traits such as psychopathy based solely on a record or file review. Further, some clients, once civilly
committed in treatment, will be directed by attorneys to refuse treatment or refuse
participation in certain aspects or types of treatment - such as phallometric assessment - and often the focus switches from mental health treatment issues to legal
issues involving matters such as self-incrimination.
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risk predictions incorporate mostly static and unchangeable factors.
To this date, actuarial risk prediction instruments focus primarily on static factors, such as age of the victim and the criminal
history of the defendant, while consideration of dynamic factors is
limited. They include elements such as termination from sex offender treatment and age after release from prison. Current research is focusing on the development of dynamic risk predictors.
Some clinicians are seeing that sex offenders’ risks are not changing dramatically while in commitment. Their actuarial scores,
which are more reliable than an evaluator’s clinical judgment, for
the most part do not change over time. Therefore, one could be
committed indefinitely.
The clinical versus actuarial debate has caused significant controversy in the psycho-legal field of violence risk prediction. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this debate; however,
overall research has increasingly revealed that actuarial risk instruments normed on certain populations of offenders exhibit more
predictive reliability and validity than the clinical judgment of psychologists and psychiatrists alone. The current research suggests
for a clinician to clinically adjust or modify actuarial risk instruments.410 To date, courts in various jurisdictions have upheld the
admissibility of actuarial risk instruments in light of Daubert.411
In a wide variety of medical and social science studies, actuarial
assessments consistently meet or surpass the accuracy of clinical as412
sessments.
Actuarial instruments address factors that are known
to be correlated with sex offending, such as length of sex offending, gender of victim, use of force, multiple victims and stranger
victims. Because actuarial data is generally viewed to be more reliable than clinical judgments, some argue that sex offenders should
be civilly committed based on actuarial risk level, not based on
410. See William M. Grove and Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionist) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, PSYCHOL., PUBLIC POLICY, AND
LAW, Vol. 2, No. 2, 293-323 (1996). The authors cited numerous studies that reveal that actuarial methods are almost invariably equal to or superior than clinical
judgment concerning risk assessment. Id at 293. See also, Richard Rogers, The
Uncritical Acceptance of Risk Assessment in Forensic Practice, LAW AND HUM.
BEHAV., Vol. 24, No. 5 (2000). The authors describe the forensic psychologist’s
role in violence risk prediction. Assessment issues to consider include comprehensiveness, measurement, and base rate estimates.
411. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
412. N. Zoe Hilton & Janet L. Simmons, The Influence of Actuarial Risk Assessment in Clinical Judgments in Tribunal Decisions about Mentally Disordered Offenders in
Maximum Security, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 394 (2001).
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413

whether their acts are avolitionally or volitionally-based. This argument is in line with an empirical decision where the subjectivity
and clinical expertise of a psychologist sometimes plays a secondary
role to the more reliable statistical information. Ideally, the psychologist should make a clinical adjustment of actuarial data. Current research indicates that actuarial data should be clinically modified or adjusted by a mental health professional.
However, the assessment of risk is difficult for a mental health
professional, as they are not able to read crystal balls. Rather, their
job is to provide the judge or jury with the most information possible. Some cases can be very difficult, as some offenders are low risk
actuarially and high clinically. When an offender scores high on
actuarial instruments, he will possess significant clinical risk factors.
In addition, clinicians are faced with the burden and dilemma of
assessing the etiology of the offending behavior between volitional
and avolitional causative factors and disorders.
For example, consider an armed robber who has antisocial
personality disorder and is avolitionally impaired, has three total
sex offense convictions, and presents with the same actuarial risk
level as that of a volitionally impaired pedophile. The pedophile
also has three sex offense convictions and does not suffer from antisocial personality disorder, but has a volitional impairment.
Based on their hypothetically similar actuarial risk, both of these
offenders should be deemed about equally sexually dangerous despite the etiology of their sex offending (volitional versus avolitional impairment). As previously mentioned, the sexual sadist
psychopathic pedophile who is both avolitionally and volitionally
impaired, and who has three sex offense convictions would be the
highest risk for sex offending.
Some authorities argue that an individual such as a career
armed robber who is violent in nature and has a severe antisocial
personality disorder should be confined indefinitely or civilly
committed after he has served his prison term to protect society
414
from future danger. Consequently, there would be no limits to
413. The most well known actuarial risk prediction instruments for sex offenders include the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised, (MnSOST-R),
Static 99, Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender Recidivism, (RRASOR). These
instruments are normed on populations of sex offenders, some who have offended
and others who have not. The factors on the instruments are assigned relative
weights and are retained if they were significantly related to re-offense status.
414. See Morse, supra note 27, at 264. Antisocial personality disorder includes a
history of conduct disorder (antisocial and delinquent behavior as a youth), fail-
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the power of the states to indefinitely incarcerate any type of dan415
gerous offender. This theory was largely argued after the implementation of the Durham rule, as attorneys and mental health professionals attempted to classify all mental disorders, including
antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, as mental diseases
or defects that could be a basis for the commission of the crime.
However, an issue that needs to be extrapolated is the definitions of mental disabilities, disorders, and abnormalities. The
problem remains that there is no distinct and consistent agreement
within the psychological and psychiatric community on definitions
of mental health issues. Simply put, this is not a simple black and
white issue and will be a continued source of debate until definitions are put into place by a legislative body. The United States
Supreme Court has consistently chosen to take a role in distinguishing definitions, and as a result, balancing community safety
versus civil liberties. For instance, in Young, the United States Supreme Court validated its decision in Hendricks, wherein it determined that the process of civil commitment of violent sexual predators is a civil act as long as sex offender treatment is provided in a
416
separate facility. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hendricks and
Young had a substantial, broad based effect on the mental health
field regarding issues such as mental illness, dangerousness, treatment, and protection of society.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Kansas Act was not punitive, nor was Hendricks charged twice for
the same offense, but that civil commitment was a civil proceeding
with a primary focus on treatment and rehabilitation. The statute
provides for treatment that is more civil than criminal in nature
and separate from corrections and punishment. The statute recognizes that some defendants cannot volitionally control themselves and they possess a mental disorder that is associated with risk
for future sexual violence. In Crane, the Court held that a sex offender can be civilly committed if he suffers from a volitional and
or emotional or personality disorder that causes him to be a risk for
future sexual dangerousness and that the volitional requirement
ure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors, deceitfulness, impulsivity, irritability and aggressiveness, reckless disregard for the safety of self or
others, consistent irresponsibility, lack of remorse. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
M ANUAL OF M ENTAL DISORDERS, 649-50 (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV).
415. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL DISORDERS, 649-50 (4th
ed. 1994) (DSM-IV).
416. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261.
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was not necessary. The key issue in Crane was the inclusion of a
personality disorder as a causal factor of one’s sex offending. The
State of Kansas (along with about sixteen other states) is not only
providing dangerous sex offenders with the treatment they need,
but is also protecting the community against the risk of reoffending by identified sex offenders. It must be noted that the
decision in Crane to civilly commit offenders who are dangerous
and suffer from a personality disorder appears to conflict with the
Court’s holding in Foucha, concerning the unconstitutionality of
civilly committing an offender who suffered from antisocial personality disorder and was deemed dangerous.
Some states like California have implemented such programs,
but are not releasing sex offenders who have been evaluated and
recommended for release. In some cases, hospital administrators
appear to be questioning and challenging the intent of the legislature and purposes of the civil commitment laws. Based solely on
the overriding recommendations of the administrators, the sex offenders are not being released, but are re-committed after participating in treatment. This raises the issue of whether civil commitment actually has a punitive purpose.
417
For example, in People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), the California Supreme Court considered a sex offender’s future after being
treated at a civil commitment hospital for sex offenders. After he
completed most of the program, evaluators recommended that he
be released, yet the hospital’s administrator would not allow the
discharge of the patient. Ghilotti had committed two separate sex
offenses, served prison terms, and was civilly committed at a state
418
hospital.
Two psychologists evaluated Ghilotti and found he
419
should be released from civil commitment.
The director disagreed with both evaluators and cited their reports that indicated a
likelihood of re-offending if Ghilotti was released without treat420
ment and supervision. The director wrote to the prosecutor, ask417. People v. Superior Court , 44 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2002) [hereinafter Ghilotti].
418. Id. at 952.
419. Id.
420. Id. The two psychologists were required by statute to be recommended by
the director. They both recommended release but also recommended he be released from the civil commitment on conditional release, which would have included supervision and treatment. Id. The psychologists emphasized that these
requirements of conditional release would be important to attempt to reduce his
risk of re-offending. Id. Hospital psychiatrists who were familiar with his treatment reported that he was not ready for unconditional release and his mental disorder continued to place him at high risk for re-offending. Id. A third evaluator
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ing her to refile a petition for his recommitment and indicated he
disagreed with the evaluators, stating their reports did fulfill the
421
statutory requirements for recommitment. The prosecuting attorney argued that the director may disregard the designated
evaluators’ reports and request a refiling of commitment if he concluded that Ghilotti remained mentally disordered and at risk for
422
future sex offending if not treated or supervised. The superior
court rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the director may request a petition for recommitment without consideration of the
evaluator’s recommendations, and it was recommended that
423
Ghilotti be released.
In Ghilotti, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue
of likely requiring substantial danger. The court held that a recommitment petition could not be filed without the agreement of
424
two designated evaluators required by the statute. The court addressed issues including whether a recommitment of a sexual offender petition may be filed without the concurrence of two desig425
nated evaluators as set forth in the statute. Further, the court
considered whether the trial court could review the evaluators’ reports for material legal error, and the definition of the statutory
standard on which the evaluators opine—such as whether the person has a mental disorder that makes him “likely” to engage in acts
426
without appropriate treatment and custody.
was also designated to evaluate Ghilotti and he also concurred with the two other
psychologists. Id. Initially, a defendant is screened by the Department of Corrections before their release from prison and then he is evaluated by two designated
mental health professionals using a standardized assessment protocol. Id. If both
evaluators concur that a person is likely to commit future sex offenses and suffers
from a mental disorder, the director will forward a request for petition. Id. If one
evaluator finds that the person meets criteria for commitment and the other one
disagrees, two independent professionals are appointed to evaluate the defendant.
Id. at 959-60. The court stated that the statute did not have a provision for judicial
review of the reports of the designated evaluators for legal error. Id. at 962.
421. Id. at 952.
422. Id. at 952. Ghilotti refused to accept all of the terms of his conditional
release plan, specifically refusing medication compliance (Luprone for chemical
sterilization purposes) and supervised outpatient treatment. Id. at 956.
423. Id. at 952.
424. Id. at 961.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 951. The director wanted the court to examine the evaluator’s
application of the law in their reports and believed they were incompetent. The
court considered the statute’s standards of assessment including evaluations focusing on a standardized assessment protocol addressing mental disorders, criminal
and sexual history, duration of sexual deviance and their association with future
sex offending risk. The evaluators answer the ultimate question of whether the
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The State argued that the purpose of the statute was to protect
the public from sex offenders, and this was best served by allowing
the director to independently evaluate the current functioning and
427
risk of the offender while under the director’s custody. In response, Ghilotti argued that the statute’s requirement of the concurrence of two evaluators, along with the failure to provide for judicial review of the evaluator’s reports, allows him a Due Process
428
right to rely solely on the two evaluators’ reports.
Ultimately, the court held that judicial review is limited to
whether the reports of the evaluator(s) are not in accordance with
429
the law. If the court’s review of the reports do not indicate material legal error, then they must accept the evaluator(s) reports and
either dismiss the petition or continue with the proceedings to de430
termine if the individual is a sexually violent predator. The court
recommended in future cases that the trial court should review the
report(s) of the evaluator(s) to determine if there is any material
431
legal error on its face.
Additionally, the court addressed the definition of “‘likely’ to
432
re-offend.” While Ghilotti attempted to define “likely” as “highly
likely” or at least “more likely than not,” the People attempted to
define it as “a significant chance, not minimal; something less than
433
‘more likely than not’ and more than merely ‘possible.’” The
offender has a mental disorder and whether he is “likely” to commit future sexual
violence without appropriate treatment and custody. Id. at 962.
427. Id. at 965. The State argued that the director, through discussion with the
treatment staff in the hospital, can assess the offender’s condition perhaps better
than outside evaluators. Id.
428. Id. at 966. The court disagreed with Ghilotti’s assertion. The court stated
that judicial power allows a judge to determine whether an evaluator’s opinion is
legally sound and follows the criteria set forth in the statute. Id. The court stated
that the director should not be powerless to protect the public when he disagrees
on legal grounds with the evaluators’ conclusions that an offender does not meet
the requirements of civil commitment; “means must exist by which he can make
that issue the subject of judicial inquiry.” Id.
429. Id. at 960. The court believed that judicial review of the reports does not
extend to issues of debatable professional judgment if they are based on correct
legal standards. If the court determines there is legal error committed by an
evaluator, it must be material legal error, affecting the evaluator’s ultimate findings and conclusions.
430. Id. The court offers the evaluator(s) the opportunity to correct the material legal error.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 962. The court addressed whether the person is diagnosed with a
mental disorder so that he is likely to commit future acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody.
433. Id. at 964. The court stated that neither party was entirely correct, and
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court also struggled with the elements of mental disorder and
434
“likely to re-offend” in the statute.
The court concluded that
“likely” involves more than the “mere possibility” that the person
will re-offend due to a mental disorder that impairs volitional con435
trol. The court held that “an evaluator must conclude that the
person is ‘likely’ to re-offend if, because of a current mental disorder which makes it difficult or impossible to restrain violent sexual
behavior, the person presents a ‘substantial danger,’ that is, a ‘serious and well-founded risk,’ that he will commit such crimes if free
436
in the community.” The court stayed Ghilotti’s release from the
civil commitment hospital pending the superior court’s determination whether to dismiss the recommitment petition as legally inadequate, or to continue with recommitment proceedings pursuant
437
to the statute.
After reading Ghilotti, does the concept of Due Process exist?
May a director of a treatment program for civilly committed sex offenders deny a sex offender’s discharge even though independently appointed evaluators recommended his conditional release?
Isn’t this prison? Will sex offenders who successfully complete a
treatment program designed for them ever be released?
did not agree that “likely” to re-offend means more than fifty percent, rather, he
must present as a “substantial danger,” a “serious and well-founded risk” of reoffending if not in custody. Id. The court agreed with Ghilotti that the phrase
“without appropriate treatment and custody” does not prevent the evaluators from
determining that the offender’s amenability to treatment reduces his risk and
therefore does not meet the criteria for commitment. Id. at 962. The court consulted with various definitions of “likely” using dictionaries and thesauruses as well
as other California court cases. The court has consistently relied upon “reasonable
likelihood” meaning less than “more probable than not” and something more
than “merely possible.” Id. at 962.
434. Id. at 965. The particular form of dangerous mental disorder rather than
the degree of dangerousness distinguishes a dangerous sex offender subject to
civil commitment from other dangerous offenders. If a defendant’s disorder
causes difficulty in controlling violent impulses that does not indicate that he has
no control over the impulses. The court addressed the issue of “likely” regarding
the purpose of the statute, to protect the public from a limited number of offenders whose incarceration is ending but continue to poses significant risks of future
sex offending. The term “likely” is also considered from a statistical standpoint
regarding the difficulty mental health experts have in predicting human behavior.
Id. at 966.
435. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d at 966.
436. Id. The court reasoned that if the offender is dangerous without treatment but safe and representing less risk of re-offending with treatment, he does
not necessarily have to be treated in custody. The needs for treatment and custody are not synonymous. Id. at 967.
437. Id. at 966.
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C. Ohio’s Sexual Violent Predator Specification on Indictment: A
State’s Criminal Alternative to Civil Commitment
In January 1997, the State of Ohio implemented what is, in this
author’s belief, a criminal code alternative to civil commitment of
sex offenders. Ohio Revised Code section 2941.148 sets forth a
sexually violent predator specification on an indictment or plea by
way of information for specific offenses including: homicide, as438
sault, kidnapping, or other sexually violent offenses. This law is
separate and distinct from the State’s community notification, sexual predator law (Ohio’s version of what is commonly referred to as
439
Megan’s Law), and Ohio Revised Code section 2950.09. Ohio’s
sexually violent predator specification statute mandates five specific
factors that a judge must consider in determining whether a person
440
is a sexually violent predator. The statute also allows a judge to
438. OHIO. REV. CODE § 2941.148 (1997).
439. OHIO. REV. CODE § 2941.148 specifically addresses the separate specification, which can be attached to a count in an indictment or an information in a
criminal case. The statute sets forth numerous factors including: the offender’s
age, prior criminal record, the age of the victim(s), multiple victims, whether
drugs or alcohol were used to impair the victims, prior sex offenses and prior sex
offender treatment, any mental illness, whether there was a pattern of abuse or
cruelty, and any additional behavioral characteristics of the defendant. In fact,
some of these factors outlined in the Ohio version of Megan’s law such as whether
drug and alcohol use to impair the victim of the instant offense are not empirically
related to sex offender recidivism. Legislators should consult with mental health
professionals in drafting future statutes in line with current research. This statute
is separate and different from OHIO. REV. CODE § 2950.09, which specifically addresses factors to be considered in determining whether an individual who is or
has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense should be classified in one of
three categories: 1) sexually oriented offender, 2) habitual offender, or 3) sexual
predator. While the first statute is essentially an additional charge in the indictment (the defendant faces an additional penalty if convicted of the specification)
and the other deals with reporting requirements of individuals upon their release
from prison, the two statutes take into consideration similar factors. OHIO. REV.
CODE § 2950.09 takes into account nine specific factors, which are similar to those
considered in OHIO. REV. CODE § 2941.148 and OHIO. REV. CODE § 2971.01(H)(1)(6). An individual may be affected by both of these statutes depending on the
charges in the indictment or on information in a criminal case.
440. OHIO. REV. CODE § 2971.01(H)(1)-(6) consists of five specific factors and
one factor which may be considered a “catch all,” which states “any other relevant
evidence.” The statute specifically states,
[a]ny of the following factors may be considered indicating a likelihood of future sexual recidivism: a) whether the person has been convicted two or more times, in separate criminal actions, of a sexually oriented offense; b) whether the person has a documented history from
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sentence an individual who is found guilty of a sexually violent
predator specification on indictment with an additional penalty of
up to life in prison.
Some opponents may argue that this is a criminal alternative to
keeping these offenders off the streets, but via a more legitimate
and criminal procedure than most civil commitment procedures.
However, others add that these individuals will never be provided
treatment to address their sexual addictions and mental health issues since they may never be released from prison with a life sentence, based on Ohio’s “truth in sentencing” guidelines.
Although some of the factors previously mentioned appear to
be legitimately related to future risk such as torture, ritualistic acts
and sexually deviant behavior, there is no definition of “likely.”
Furthermore, the last element contains a clause which is convenient for prosecutors, stating the “any other relevant evidence”
“catch all” could potentially quantify or qualify any risk factor—
whether it is empirically related to future risk or not. Is this a good
or fair alternative to the present civil commitment laws in other
states?
Based on a reading of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in
Hendricks, it is likely that he would find Ohio’s sexually violent
predator specification law to be a fair alternative to civil commitment. In fact, there is a potential argument that Ohio’s approach
is more fair to an individual’s civil liberties since the punitive intent
of the act is clear from the onset, as opposed to being couched as
therapeutic through a civil commitment scheme. Are civil commitment laws only masquerades for a longer prison term? Would
not lengthy indeterminate sentencing schemes with harsh and punitive sentencing laws for repeat sex offenders make sense as an alternative? Would treating the high-risk sex offenders in prison before they are to be released be a plausible option?
The State of Ohio avoids spending millions of the taxpayers’
childhood, into the juvenile developmental years, that exhibits sexually
deviant behavior; c) whether available information or evidence suggests that the person chronically commits offenses with a sexual motivation; d) whether the person has committed one or more offenses in
which the person has tortured or engaged in ritualistic acts with one or
more victims; e) whether the person has committed one or more offenses in which one or more victims were physically harmed to the degree that the particular victim’s life was in jeopardy; f) any other relevant evidence.
OHIO. REV. CODE § 2971.01(H)(2)(a)-(f).
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dollars on providing high-risk offenders a treatment facility, which
would require maximum security procedures and staff. Ohio is also
saving the hiring costs of experts to evaluate these offenders in
lengthy civil commitment jury trials, or conduct their annual reexaminations. Some argue that these cases are as difficult and time
consuming as death penalty cases. Some research indicates a significant difference in recidivism amongst treated versus untreated
sex offenders. However, these studies usually do not include the
worst of the worst as their sample. If the goal is treatment, how do
legislators know that the treatment will work with the highest risk
offenders? Or, is this just a masquerade for prison and keeping so441
ciety safe at the cost of individual liberty?
The interplay of law and psychology is an interesting one, but
there are no certain crystal balls or mathematical formulas to aid in
determining one’s “likely” risk of sexually re-offending. The stakes
are enormous. The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in
Hendricks and Crane impact these two unique fields in a compelling
fashion. In fact, it seems as though the Court conflicts itself regarding their decisions in Crane and Foucha leaving the reader uncertain
about whether a dangerous offender with an emotional/personality
disorder can be civilly committed. The Court does not define
“mental illness” or “likely,” and leaves it in the hands of mental
health professionals to evaluate and lawyers to argue, intricate issues of what makes a mind tick. Is the vicious sex offense and likelihood of re-offending due to an antisocial personality or a deviant
sexual disorder? In either case, no one will ever know for certain if
the offender will ever re-offend. Can society take that chance?

441. See John Q. LaFond, The Costs of Enacting A Sexual Predator Law, 4
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’ Y, & LAW 486 (1998) (discussing the economic costs of implementing a civil commitment law for sex offenders).
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